Moral hazard and the composition of transfers: theory and evidence from cross-border transfers

Amegashie, J. Atsu; Ouattara, Bazoumana; Strobl, Eric

doi:10.1007/s10101-013-0123-4

Cited by 17 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…This paper adds to the sparse literature (Amegashie et al, 2007;Clay et al, 2009) on the determinants of aid tying, and to a growing body of empirical evidence on the adverse impact of fragmented aid (Anderson, 2011;Djankov et al, 2009;Knack & Rahman, 2007). 5 See www.aiddata.org 6 The qualifying term substantially is intended to allow compliance with international sanctions on pariah countries.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…15 Amegashie et al (2007) nd an insignicant relationship between aid tying by bilateral donors and the quality of governance in recipient countries. Although their theoretical exposition emphasizes corruption, they measure quality of governance empirically with the Freedom House indicators of civil liberties and political freedoms.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Donor aid share remains highly signicant in both tests. Amegashie et al (2007) raise the possibility that the costs of tying aid must be balanced against losses from graft when aid is untied. Where corruption levels are high, tying aid does not necessarily reduces its development benets.…”

Section: Empirical Testingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, a third argument on ecient aid tying is more empirically tractable. Amegashie, Quattara, and Strobl (2007) raise the possibility that tying aid could prevent it from being embezzled by public ocials. The implication is that where corruption is suciently severe, the development benets from tied aid could exceed those from untied aid.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Aid Tying and Donor Fragmentation

Knack

Smets

2012

Policy Research Working Papers

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This study analyzes theoretically and empirically the impact of aid fragmentation on donors' decisions to tie their development aid to purchases from contractors based in their own countries. Building on collective action theory, it argues that a donor with a larger share of the aid market in a country has stronger incentives to maximize the development impact of its aid, by tying less of it. Empirical tests strongly and consistently support the prediction that higher donor aid shares will be associated with less aid tying. This nding is robust to recipient controls, donor xed eects and instrumental variables estimation. Furthermore, it contradicts other studies suggesting that when a small number of donors dominate the aid market in a country, they may exploit their monopoly power by tying more of their aid.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Empirical Testingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Aid Tying and Donor Fragmentation

Knack

Smets

2012

Policy Research Working Papers

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“…24 This is consistent with the Kantian notion of duty mentioned above (see, for example, Sullivan, 1994) and the discussion of equity issues in the distribution of the burden of greenhouse gas reductions (e.g., Stern, 2013). 25 This is also the same in political agency models as in Coate and Morris (1995), Besley and Prat (2006), and Amegashie et al (2013) in which an honest leader is non-strategic. Kartik and McAfee (2007) also refer to a politician with character as procedurally-motivated.…”

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confidence: 90%

Public Goods, Signaling, and Norms of Conscientious Leadership

Amegashie

2016

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Public Goods, Signaling, and Norms of Conscientious Leadership Abstract I study a sequential-move public goods game based on the notion that leadership comes with an obligation; conscientious leadership. Provision by the leader of an amount of the public good below a minimum imposes a psychological cost on the follower which increases his unit cost of contribution. The leader has private information about his type and his cost of contributing to the public good. The model combines a follower's concern for fairness and informational signaling about conscientious leadership. I find that, under certain conditions, the follower's equilibrium contribution is an increasing or non-monotonic function of the leader's equilibrium contribution. The non-monotonicity result is consistent with evidence in a recent field experiment (Jack and Recalde, J. Public Econ, 2015) but cannot be obtained in previous theoretical models of voluntary public goods games that were based on only signaling information (i.e., about the quality of the public good or the return to contributions to the public good). Surprisingly, I find that, for this result to hold, the follower's distaste for nonconscientious leadership must be sufficiently low. I also find that the leader may not act conscientiously if he does not have an informational advantage to exploit. JEL-Codes: H000, H300, H500. Terms of use: Documents in

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Why Untie Aid? An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of South Korea's Untied Aid from 2010 to 2013

Chung

Eom

Jung

2015

J of Intl Development

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As untying aid was widely considered key to enhancing aid effectiveness, the South Korean government decided to increase the share of untied aid. While the share increased substantially in recent years, considerable variation exists in the proportion of untied aid provided to different recipient countries. This article explores the reasons why. We identify three key variables: international factors, economic interests and recipient country governance. By analysing South Korea's aid data for the period 2010-2013, we find that Korea's aid-untying practice is affected by international norms and the recipient country's governance, but not by peer pressure and economic interests.

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Moral hazard and the composition of transfers: theory and evidence from cross-border transfers

Cited by 17 publications

References 28 publications

Aid Tying and Donor Fragmentation

Aid Tying and Donor Fragmentation

Public Goods, Signaling, and Norms of Conscientious Leadership

Why Untie Aid? An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of South Korea's Untied Aid from 2010 to 2013

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