Public Goods, Signaling, and Norms of Conscientious Leadership

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Public Goods, Signaling, and Norms of Conscientious Leadership Abstract I study a sequential-move public goods game based on the notion that leadership comes with an obligation; conscientious leadership. Provision by the leader of an amount of the public good below a minimum imposes a psychological cost on the follower which increases his unit cost of contribution. The leader has private information about his type and his cost of contributing to the public good. The model combines a follower's concern for fairness and informational signaling about conscientious leadership. I find that, under certain conditions, the follower's equilibrium contribution is an increasing or non-monotonic function of the leader's equilibrium contribution. The non-monotonicity result is consistent with evidence in a recent field experiment (Jack and Recalde, J. Public Econ, 2015) but cannot be obtained in previous theoretical models of voluntary public goods games that were based on only signaling information (i.e., about the quality of the public good or the return to contributions to the public good). Surprisingly, I find that, for this result to hold, the follower's distaste for nonconscientious leadership must be sufficiently low. I also find that the leader may not act conscientiously if he does not have an informational advantage to exploit. JEL-Codes: H000, H300, H500. Terms of use: Documents in

Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation Altered Voluntary Cooperative Norms Compliance Under Equal Decision-Making Power

“…In recent years, social norm compliance is explained as a black box meant to capture a few of the influences of social environment on individuals’ decisions (Andreoni and Douglas Bernheim, 2007 ; Fishbein and Icek, 2010 ; Schram and Charness, 2015 ). Investigations of social norm compliance usually focus on either social norms can be enforced by threatening norm violators in the framework with sanctions options like ultimatum game (UG; Forsythe et al, 1994 ; Fehr and Gächter, 2002 ; Nelissen and Mulder, 2013 ; Eriksson et al, 2017 ), or it can be voluntary maintained in the framework such as public goods game (PG) and prisoner dilemma game (Nese and Sbriglia, 2009 ; Reuben and Riedl, 2013 ; Amegashie, 2016 ; Chaudhuri et al, 2016 ; Realpe-Gómez et al, 2018 ).…”