Monopoly and monitoring: an approach to political clientelism

Medina, Luis Fernando; Stokes, Susan C.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511585869.003

Cited by 85 publications

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“…2 A key difference between patronage and other clientelistic or vote buying strategies is that it implies the distribution of state resources and therefore can only be conducted by the party in power (Medina and Stokes 2007). Theoretical arguments suggest that public sector employment is an attractive tool for patronage, compared to other forms of redistributing public resources towards supporters, because jobs are easily targeted (Persson and Tabellini 1999;Lizzeri and Persico 2001), can conceal the extent of redistribution (Coate and Morris 1995) and can help overcome political commitment problems (Robinson and Verdier 2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

To the Victor Belongs the Spoils? Party Membership and Public Sector Employment in Brazil

2017

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We analyze how political discretion affects the selection of government workers, using individual-level data on political party membership and matched employer-employee data on the universe of formal workers in Brazil. Exploiting close mayoral races, we find that winning an election leads to an increase of over 40% in the number of members of the winning party working in the municipal bureaucracy. Employment of members of the ruling party increases relatively more in senior positions, but also expands in lower-ranked jobs, suggesting that discretionary appointments are used both to influence policymaking and to reward supporters. We find that party members hired after their party is elected tend be of similar or even higher quality than members of the runner-up party, contrary to common perceptions that political appointees are less qualified. Moreover, the increased public employment of members of the ruling party is long-lasting, extending beyond the end of the mayoral term.JEL Classification: D72, D73, H70, J45

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

To the Victor Belongs the Spoils? Party Membership and Public Sector Employment in Brazil

2017

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“…7 Calvo and Murillo 2013;Mainwaring 1999;Medina and stokes 2007;robinson and verdier 2013;schaffer and schedler 2007;van de Walle 2007. 8 Medina and stokes 2007;keefer 2005. Clientelistic and public goods platforms can also coexist, as politicians engage in mixed strategies to hedge their electoral risks; singer 2009.…”

Section: H I S T O R I Ca L T R a J E C T O R I Es O F C Li En T Eli S Mmentioning

confidence: 99%

Patronage, Trust, and State Capacity

Buštíková¹,

Corduneanu-Huci

2017

World Pol.

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WHen do politicians engage in clientelistic exchange with their voters? direct or mediated patron-client relations built on personal ties preceded the emergence of faceless bureaucracies tasked with ambitious public projects.1 yet clientelism, a seemingly ancient way of getting things done in exchange for votes, flourishes even among wealthy democracies in the twenty-first century. 2 We focus on the historical origins of trust in the state and show that they have a lasting impact on patronage. We argue that lack of trust in the state, rather than affluence, greases the wheels of patron-client linkages.3 trust, which ultimately reduces clientelism, originates in competence. Where public administration has historically failed to satisfy citizens' needs, entrenched memories of that failure lead to skepticism and deepen the reliance on personalized, clientelistic relationships today.We account for both the demand side and the supply side of clientelism. Past experiences with public administrators create reputations that shape individual expectations about state capacity, constrain

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“…In urban settings, repeated game structure of elections offers politicians coercive power in cases of defection, providing goods contingent on support (Stokes, 2005). In this regard, incumbents can establish credible threats against clients who renege on their commitments (Medina & Stokes, 2007). However, secret ballots mostly prevent politicians from controlling the final choices of their clients.…”

Section: Rural-urban Divide In Clientelismmentioning

confidence: 99%

A comparative analysis of clientelism in Greece, Spain, and Turkey: the rural–urban divide

Çınar

2016

Contemporary Politics

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This article examines the evolution of patron-client relationships in Greece, Spain, and Turkey through the prism of the rural-urban divide. It traces which modes of clientelism (rural or urban) are more evident in these countries today, and why. Further, it finds that in rural modes of clientelism, normative bonds of deference and loyalty with a Weberian notion of 'traditional authority' and affective ties between political patrons and clients are more observable whereas urban modes of clientelism usually yield Downsian competition between political machines with more coercive motives. It suggests that these two notions of clientelism are not mutually exclusive but should rather be seen in a continuum. More generally, this article demonstrates the need in the existing literature for more contextualized analyses that take into account differences between socioeconomic and geographical antecedents of rural vs. urban clientelism and their divergent political reflections.

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Monopoly and monitoring: an approach to political clientelism

Cited by 85 publications

References 0 publications

To the Victor Belongs the Spoils? Party Membership and Public Sector Employment in Brazil

To the Victor Belongs the Spoils? Party Membership and Public Sector Employment in Brazil

Patronage, Trust, and State Capacity

A comparative analysis of clientelism in Greece, Spain, and Turkey: the rural–urban divide

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