Monkeypox re-emergence in Africa: a call to expand the concept and practice of One Health

Abstract

Introduction: Monkeypox is a re-emerging viral zoonosis that occurs naturally in heavily forested regions of West and Central Africa. Inter-human transmission of monkeypox virus, although limited, drives outbreaks, particularly in household and health-care settings. But the available evidence suggests that without repeated zoonotic introductions, human infections would eventually cease to occur. Therefore, interrupting virus transmission from animals to humans is key to combating this disease. Areas covered: Herein we review laboratory and field studies examining the susceptibility of various animal taxa to monkeypox virus infection, and note the competence of various species to serve as reservoirs or transmission hosts. In addition, we discuss early socio-ecologic theories of monkeypox virus transmission in rural settings and review current modes of ecologic investigation – including ecologic niche modeling, and ecologic sampling – in light of their potential to identify specific animal species and features of the environment that are associated with heightened risk for human disease. Expert opinion: The role of disease ecology and scientific research in ongoing disease prevention efforts should be reinforced, particularly for wildlife-associated zoonoses such as monkeypox. Such efforts alongside those aimed at nurturing ‘One Health’ collaborations may ultimately hold the greatest promise for reducing human infections with this pathogen.

Infectious Disease Risk Across the Growing Human-Non Human Primate Interface: A Review of the Evidence

“…Once transmitted to humans, the virus is very contagious and person-to-person transmission of MPXV occurs through respiratory droplets or body fluids leading to larger outbreaks in human populations. However, there is evidence suggesting that without repeated zoonotic introductions of the virus, human infections would eventually cease to occur (218). In both cases discussed above, the threat is known and it is possible to take preventive measures or to promptly set up therapy after infection of an individual.…”

Here, There, and Everywhere: The Wide Host Range and Geographic Distribution of Zoonotic Orthopoxviruses

“…Currently, MPXV is mostly observed in Africa; CPXV in Europe and Asia; BPXV in Asia and the Middle East; and VACV in South America [ 53 , 54 , 55 , 56 , 119 , 140 , 160 , 162 , 168 , 205 ]. Although the factors that restrict the geographic distribution of some zoonotic orthopoxviruses are still unknown, their distribution range has been increasing as MPXV has been exported to parts of the USA [ 77 ], United Kingdom [ 96 ], Israel [ 98 ], and Singapore [ 99 ].…”

Genes that control vaccinia virus immunogenicity

“…В результате отказа от вакцинации против оспы к настоящему времени большая часть человеческой популяции не имеет специфического иммунитета не только против данного заболевания, но и других зоонозных ортопоксвирусных инфекций [6]. Именно поэтому в последние годы в различных регионах мира стали регистрировать необычно массовые вспышки ортопоксвирусных инфекций среди людей [34,35]. Единственным эффективным методом борьбы с возрастающей угрозой ортопоксвирусных инфекций человека является вакцинопрофилактика [1,3].…”