Monitoring and Physical-Layer Attack Mitigation in SDN-Controlled Quantum Key Distribution Networks

Abstract

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) has been identified as a secure method for providing symmetric keys between two parties based on the fundamental laws of quantum physics, making impossible for a third party to copy the quantum states exchanged without being detected by the sender (Alice) and receiver (BoB) and without altering the original states. However, when QKD is applied in a deployed optical network, physical layer intrusions may occur in the optical links by injecting harmful signals directly into the optical fibre. This can have a detrimental effect on the key distribution and eventually lead to its disruption. On the other hand, network architectures with software defined networking (SDN) benefit from a homogeneous and unified control plane that can seamlessly control a QKD enabled optical network end-to-end. There is no need for a separate QKD control, a separate control for each segment of an optical network and an orchestrator to coordinate between these parts. Furthermore, SDN allows customised and application tailored control and algorithm provisioning, such as QKD aware optical path computation, to be deployed in the network, independent of the underlying infrastructure. Therefore, in this manuscript, we investigate the integration of the application, SDN and QKD infrastructure layers and confirm capability for flexible supervision and uninterrupted key service provisioning in the event of link level attacks. An experimental demonstrator is used, for the first time, to verify the architecture proposed, considering realtime monitoring of quantum parameters and fiberoptic link intruders to emulate real-world conditions. Furthermore, attacks on a standard single-mode fiber (via a 3dB coupler) and a multicore fiber (via an adjacent core) are undertaken to explore different connectivity between QKD units. Results show an additional attacker identification and switching time of less than 60ms for the link cases investigated, being negligible compared to the total (re)initialization time of 14 minutes of the QKD units.

Quantum Key Distribution

“…The SDN-based experiment of monitoring and mitigation of physical layer attacks was reported [162]. Real-time monitoring of QBER and the secret key rate was used to recalculate routes for the quantum channel establishment.…”

Machine Learning for Optical Network Security Monitoring: A Practical Perspective

“…Planning of protection resources capable of guaranteeing protection from jamming attacks based on identifying overlaps in attack scopes of the working and the backup path of each connection was presented in [35]. In [36], the authors experimentally demonstrated mitigation of attacks in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)-enabled optical networks under physical-layer attacks aimed at key-rate degradation.…”

Secure Quantum Communication Technologies and Systems: From Labs to Markets

“…Other examples of how the SDN and network function virtualization (NFV) paradigms-widely adopted in classical networks-can be extended to quantum networks, including internet of Things (IoT) [54] and 5G [55] applications, are reported in [55][56][57][58][59][60][61][62][63], further proving the importance of moving from current point-to-point setups to more complex topologies. Furthermore, recent advances in machine learning (ML) can greatly help to improve the automation of QKD systems, whose performance depends of many parameters that must be finely tuned, thereby significantly decreasing operational and maintenance costs.…”