2015
DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.12214
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Monetary Policy and Asset Prices: A Mechanism Design Approach

Abstract: We investigate the effects of monetary policy on asset prices in economies where assets are traded periodically in bilateral meetings. The trading mechanism is designed to maximize social welfare taking as given the frictions in the environment and monetary policy. We show that asset price "bubbles" emerge in a constrained-efficient monetary equilibrium only if liquidity is abundant and the first-best allocation is implementable. In contrast, if liquidity is scarce, assets are priced at their fundamental value… Show more

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Cited by 25 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…Another difference is that in our model the liquidity premium vanishes for high levels of inflation: when inflation is high, agents carry so little money that even a small supply of the asset can be enough to acquire all the available real balances, and the marginal unit of the asset is only useful as a store of value, which is to say that the asset is priced at fundamental. Hu and Rocheteau () arrive at a similar result in a model where assets compete directly with money as media of exchange, and the trading mechanism in bilateral meetings in the decentralized market is designed to maximize social welfare subject to certain frictions of the environment.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 85%
“…Another difference is that in our model the liquidity premium vanishes for high levels of inflation: when inflation is high, agents carry so little money that even a small supply of the asset can be enough to acquire all the available real balances, and the marginal unit of the asset is only useful as a store of value, which is to say that the asset is priced at fundamental. Hu and Rocheteau () arrive at a similar result in a model where assets compete directly with money as media of exchange, and the trading mechanism in bilateral meetings in the decentralized market is designed to maximize social welfare subject to certain frictions of the environment.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 85%
“…Note that because of quasi-linearity, we may replace the lottery with its expected value d (in terms of the numéraire) which ranges (continuously) from 0 to m. The value function for a buyer holding m units of money is V b ( m) that solves (7). Substituting V b ( m) into the buyer's CM value function, his CM problem can be re-expressed as…”
Section: Main Results: Implementationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…where is the CM price for money. 7 The di¤erence between (2) and (3) is that in the latter money holdings are restricted to N 0 but agents are allowed to randomize over N 0 .…”
Section: The Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…They find that in any stationary monetary equilibrium, capital has a higher rate of return than fiat money. In Hu and Rocheteau (2015), they study the effects of monetary policy on asset prices. Although some research questions are similar to ours, such as which conditions are necessary for first-best allocations to be obtained, our paper differs from this literature in that we do not study coexistence issues, since we restrict attention to cases where a single exchange medium is sufficient.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%