Modes of ambiguous communication

Kellner, Christian; Quement, Mark Thordal-Le

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.010

Cited by 18 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Tractable and widely accepted ambiguity theories were not available when the foundations of game theory were developed. Such ambiguity theories only became available later (surveyed by Marinacci, 2015), and several theoretical papers subsequently applied ambiguity theories to game theory (surveyed by Evren, 2019 p. 287 andKellner andle Quement, 2017 p. 272). Empirical studies began to appear only recently.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social and strategic ambiguity versus betrayal aversion

Turmunkh

Wakker

2020

Games and Economic Behavior

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This paper examines the difference between strategic ambiguity as in game theory and ambiguity arising in individual decisions. We identify a new, non-strategic component underlying all strategic ambiguities, called social ambiguity. We recommend controlling for it to better identify strategic causes. Thus, we shed new light on Bohnet and Zeckhauser's betrayal aversion in the trust game. We first show theoretically that, contrary to preceding claims in the literature, ambiguity attitudes can play a role here. We then show experimentally that social ambiguity, rather than betrayal aversion, can explain our empirical findings. Using our new control, we identify the unique effect of strategic ambiguity. Strategic complexity increases ambiguity perception and thus increases people's likelihood insensitivity when making decisions under strategic ambiguity. Our results show the usefulness of controlling for ambiguity attitudes before speculating on strategic factors.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social and strategic ambiguity versus betrayal aversion

Turmunkh

Wakker

2020

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…This paper joins a recently growing literature studying information transmission with ambiguity. This includes the work of Kellner and Le Quement (2017), who simplified communication via a two state and two action model. In a follow up paper, Kellner and Le Quement (2018) introduced endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk model by allowing the ambiguity aversion receiver to perform Ellsbergian randomization.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Ambiguous Cheap Talk

Li¹

2022

Preprint

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This paper explores how ambiguity affects communication. We consider a cheap talk model in which the receiver evaluates the sender's message with respect to its worst-case expected payoff generated by multiplier preferences. We characterize the receiver's optimal strategy and show that the receiver's posterior action is consistent with his ex-ante action. We find that in some situations, ambiguity improves communication by shifting the receiver's optimal action upwards, and these situations are not rare.

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“…Blume et al (2007) and Blume and Board (2014) show that the presence of vagueness may facilitate communication between Sender and Receiver. Kellner and Le Quement (2017) solve a simplified two actions/two states game where ambiguity is present in Receiver's priors but not as a strategic choice of Sender. They show that Sender would use more messages under this assumption than with the regular Bayesian prior.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Ambiguous persuasion

Beauchêne

Jian

2019

Journal of Economic Theory

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We study a persuasion game à la Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) where players are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). With no prior ambiguity, a Sender may choose to use ambiguous communication devices. Our main result characterizes the value of optimal ambiguous persuasion, which is often higher than what is feasible under Bayesian persuasion. We characterize posteriors that are potentially plausible when they are generated by ambiguous devices. One way to construct an optimal ambiguous communication device is by using synonyms, messages that lead to the same posteriors, in which Sender can hedge himself against ambiguity while inducing actions from Receiver that would not be possible under standard Bayesian persuasion. We also show that the use of synonyms are a necessary * We are grateful to the Editor, Marciano Siniscalchi, and two anonymous referees for very constructive comments and suggestions that have significantly improved the paper. We are also grateful to Pierre

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Modes of ambiguous communication

Cited by 18 publications

References 16 publications

Social and strategic ambiguity versus betrayal aversion

Social and strategic ambiguity versus betrayal aversion

Ambiguous Cheap Talk

Ambiguous persuasion

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