Ambiguous persuasion

Abstract

We study a persuasion game à la Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) where players are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). With no prior ambiguity, a Sender may choose to use ambiguous communication devices. Our main result characterizes the value of optimal ambiguous persuasion, which is often higher than what is feasible under Bayesian persuasion. We characterize posteriors that are potentially plausible when they are generated by ambiguous devices. One way to construct an optimal ambiguous communication device is by using synonyms, messages that lead to the same posteriors, in which Sender can hedge himself against ambiguity while inducing actions from Receiver that would not be possible under standard Bayesian persuasion. We also show that the use of synonyms are a necessary * We are grateful to the Editor, Marciano Siniscalchi, and two anonymous referees for very constructive comments and suggestions that have significantly improved the paper. We are also grateful to Pierre

Comparative Profitability of Product Disclosure Statements

“…Finally, our paper can shed light on the persuasion literature (Bergemann and Morris, 2019;Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). It is particularly related to recent papers that analyze the design of information structures with behavioral agents (Lipnowski and Mathevet, 2018;Beauchêne et al, 2019;Lipnowski et al, Forthcoming).…”

ambigüedad y su afectación en las organizaciones. Una revisión de literatura.

“…Lo que convierte a la ambigüedad en un elemento inherente a los ambientes caóticos y cambiantes, por tanto, las acciones que la mitigan es el uso de la claridad, la coherencia en la comunicación y las expresiones emocionales facilitando estratégicamente alcanzar los objetivos, conservar el equilibrio del poder en el liderazgo y actuar eficazmente ante los retos. De manera que, las ambigüedades o información divergentes se soluciona mediante el consenso de perspectivas, actitudes que contrarrestan las incertidumbres y gestión de las diferencias para disminuir riesgos cuando se presentan (Deschamps, 2019;Boisseuil, 2019;Berger y Bosetti, 2020;Ptaszynski, Masui y Ishii, 2019;Engemann y Scott, 2018;kim et al, 2019;Beauchene et al, 2018), de ahí que, los líderes y/o gerentes que dirigen procesos o situaciones que suceden en el entorno laboral; deben poseer competencias tales como la flexibilidad, la adaptación, la gestión y la objetividad para responder de forma exitosa a los desafíos. De igual manera, deben tener un equipo que trabaje efectivamente en el entorno, fortalezca sus habilidades, tome decisiones y comprenda los procesos que se gestan al interior de las organizaciones (Lund, 2019).…”

Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse Players

“…When this weighting term is constant, as is the case under ambiguity neutrality, the smooth rule reduces to Bayes'rule. 11 For clarity, the smooth rule formula is stated in two pieces, one for updating to an initial information set from the ex-ante stage, and the other for updating to a current information set from the previous one. The smooth rule pins down i's updating at all information sets (both on and o¤ path) except those that i does not view as reachable from the immediately preceding information set given .…”