Models of the Significance of Interlocking Corporate Directorates

Koenig, Thomas; Gogel, Robisrt; Sonquist, John A.

doi:10.1111/j.1536-7150.1979.tb02877.x

Cited by 153 publications

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“…In this study, however, I wish to advance a different line of analysis-one that complements, rather than replicates, Mizruchi's research on the relationship between director interlocks and political cohesion. One of the early and most important findings of the research on interlocking directorates is the fact that "broken ties" (situations in which an interlock between firms is severed by the death or retirement of a director) are not typically restored through the exchange of a new director (Koenig, Gogel, and Sonquist 1979;Ornstein 1980;Palmer 1983). This finding has led many to the conclusion that the significance of director interlocks for firms cannot, in most cases, be located at the level of the specific interfirm dyad, but must be interpreted as a general resource that facilitates (through any of a number of equivalent channels) the flow of communication, monitoring of events, or projection of influence across the larger corporate network (Useem 1984;Mintz and Schwartz 1985;Stearns and Mizruchi 1986).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…It is worth recalling, however, that the theoretical conclusions drawn by the authors of the original broken-tie studies pointed toward an even more radical reorientation of research on interlocking directorates. For Koenig et al (1979), Ornstein (1980), and Palmer (1983), the fact that accidentally broken ties were not typically reconstituted with new ties to the same firm was taken as evidence that interlocks were not primarily interorganizational phenomena and might be better conceptualized as intraclass phenomena-that is, as social ties among corporate elites and other members of the capitalist class. 4 This implied that the answer to the question What do interlocks do?…”

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Interlocking Directorates and Political Cohesion among Corporate Elites

Burris¹

2005

American Journal of Sociology

282

161

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This study uses data on campaign contributions and methods of network analysis to investigate the significance of interlocking directorates for political cohesion among corporate elites. Using quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) regression, the author shows that social ties formed through common membership on corporate boards contribute more to similarity of political behavior than commonalities of economic interests, such as those associated with operating in the same industry or the same geographic region. Moreover, the politically cohesive effects of directorship ties remain robust even as one moves several links down the chain of indirect ties that connect top corporate officers to one another. The study thus provides empirical support for the thesis that social networks among corporate elites facilitate political cohesion within the business community.Interlocking directorates among major U.S. corporations have been a focus of political and scholarly interest since the early 20th century. In recent decades, advances in computer technology and methods of network analysis have led to a virtual explosion of empirical studies of interlocking corporate directorates. Despite this extensive body of research, important questions remain as to the meaning and significance of director interlocks. As Mizruchi (1996) notes in his review of the literature, the question What do interlocks do? is perhaps the most crucial question confronting interlocks research. Critics of the early studies of director interlocks argued that this research was mostly descriptive and that the social, political, and economic effects of interlocking directorates were more often assumed than empirically demonstrated. Partly in response to this criticism, con-1 I wish to thank

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Interlocking Directorates and Political Cohesion among Corporate Elites

Burris¹

2005

American Journal of Sociology

282

161

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“…Muitas outras formulações teóricas se associam aos pressupostos da governança corporativa, dentre as quais as teorias da firma (COASE, 1937;ALCHIAN;DEMSETZ, 1972), dos stakeholders (JONES, 1995;DONALDSON;PRESTON, 1995;FLAK;ROSE, 2005), do poder (MINTZBERG, 1984;TOWNLEY, 1993), do stewardship (DONALDSON; DAVIS, 1991; DAVIS; SCHOORMAN; DONALDSON, 1997), da dependência de recursos (DOOLEY, 1969;PFEFFER, 1972;PEARCE II, 1989;BOYD, 1990;PEARCE II;ZAHRA, 1992;DALTON, 1994aDALTON, , 1994b); e da dependência de recursos associada ao Conselho de Administração (KOENIG; GOGEL; SONQUIST, 1979;BOYD, 1990;HILLMAN;CANNELLA JR;PAETZOLD, 2000;HILLMAN, 2005).…”

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Da harmonização do conflito de interesses ao papel externo do conselho de administração: uma conotação contributiva ao desempenho

Camilo¹,

Marcon

Bandeira-de-Mello

2011

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Da harmonização do conflito de interesses ao papel externo do conselho de administração: uma conotação contributiva ao desempenho RESUMO Este artigo visa explorar as atividades externas do board of diretors (Conselho de Administração), demonstrando as diferentes atribuições de seus membros, de modo comparável, à luz das teorias da firma, da stewardship e, especialmente, da dependência de recursos. Por intermédio de uma revisão teórica, o artigo pretende contribuir com os estudos sobre esse tema apresentando a integração de um dos mecanismos internos da governança representado aqui pelo Conselho de Administração, destacando o papel relacional firma-ambiente ancorado na teoria da dependência de recursos. Dessa forma, o artigo está estruturado apresentando a teoria da agência com ênfase nas atividades de monitoramento do board, a teoria stewardship e a teoria da dependência de recursos destacando a importância dos membros do conselho na contribuição com o desempenho da firma. Finaliza, destacando o papel influente do Conselho de Administração, como um importante mecanismo interno de governança das corporações. Palavras

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“…As ownership became dispersed among many small shareholders, control of the firm was claimed to pass into the hands of disinterested managers (Berle and Means, 1932). If this were so, corporate directors and interlocks would be no more than window-dressing, irrelevant to economic power (Koenig et al, 1979). Power structure researchers questioned managerialism on many counts.…”

Section: Power Structure Research and The Turn To Network Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%