Models of Responsiveness: The Lausanne Peace Negotiations (1922–1923)

Beriker, Nimet; Druckman, Daniel

doi:10.1080/00224545.1991.9713853

Cited by 13 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…The Turkish language transcripts 2 from the 11 plenary sessions of blocto-bloc negotiations at Lausanne were coded according to the categories of the bargaining process analysis (BPA) system (Walcott & Hopmann, 1978;Walcott, Hopmann, & King, 1977; see also Beriker & Druckman, 1991, for an analysis of the round-by-round moves made by each bloc based on the coded transcripts). For purposes of this analysis we focus on the discussions of two working groups, the group dealing with the conflict over the Bosphorus and Dardanelle Straits and the group considering the question of protecting the civil rights and freedoms of minority groups.…”

Section: The Negotiation Transcriptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simulating the Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-1923: Power Asymmetries in Bargaining

Beriker

Druckman

1996

Simulation & Gaming

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Section: The Negotiation Transcriptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simulating the Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-1923: Power Asymmetries in Bargaining

Beriker

Druckman

1996

Simulation & Gaming

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“…Although I was not his research assistant, he introduced me to Bargaining Process Analysis (BPA) and asked me to code the transcripts. This collaboration produced a replication article (Beriker & Druckman, 1991) which looked at different models of reciprocity. The same data set was later used in my doctoral dissertation.…”

Section: Experimental Simulations and Dan Druckman's International Oumentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The same data set was later used in my doctoral dissertation. We replicated the power configurations of the Lausanne Peace conference in an experimental simulation and coded the real-world transcripts to check on the external validity of our findings (Beriker & Druckman, 1991, 1996.…”

Section: Experimental Simulations and Dan Druckman's International Oumentioning

confidence: 99%

Innovations in Doing Conflict Research: The Legacy of Daniel Druckman

Beriker

Nan

Larson³

et al. 2017

Negotiation Conflict Man Res

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This article celebrates Daniel (Dan) Druckman, the recipient of the 2003 Lifetime Achievement Award of the International Association for Conflict Management (IACM), and provides glimpses of his career through the lens of his former graduate students and current colleagues. Our accounts illustrate Dan's teaching philosophy as teaching by doing, his long-lasting passion for pragmatic, evidence-based analysis; his innovative application of research methods; and his international outreach. Each narrated experience demonstrates how Dan's holistic understanding of scholarship and his creative teaching, science, and practice have influenced the next generations of scholars. These accounts are integrated with a systematic analysis of Dan's publications to display his persistence in pushing the boundaries of the field by synthesizing variables, building theories, and bridging micro-level interactions to the broader political environment.

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“…In their spending on arms, U.S. and Soviet leaders also tended to respond not to the absolute arms spending of the rival but, rather, to changes or innovations in its expected level of spending (Williams and McGinnis, 1988). However, a number of studies of international negotiations, primarily concerning arms limitations, have found little support for a model of "trend reciprocity", in which side A responds reciprocally to changes or trends in side B's behavior -i.e., the extent to which B becomes more cooperative or more conflictive (Stoll and McAndrew, 1986;Druckman and Harris, 1990;Beriker and Druckman, 1991). Similarly, a study of general interactions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during most of the Cold War period found no support for a model of trend reciprocity (Patchen and Bogumil, 1995).…”

Section: Prior Actions Of Othermentioning

confidence: 99%

When Does Reciprocity in the Actions of Nations Occur?

Patchen¹

1998

Int Negot

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To understand the occurrence of reciprocation, we must consider the ways in which the prior actions of another nation may affect decision makers' expectancies and the values they give to various possible outcomes of the interaction. Cooperative prior action by the other tends to raise the actor's expectancy that his own cooperative action will result in mutual cooperation and also to increase the intrinsic value of cooperation. Conflictive actions by the other nation will tend to raise the value that decision makers place on winning over the other and to decrease their expectancies that cooperative behavior will result in mutual cooperation. While the prior actions of the other tend to lead to reciprocation, its occurrence depends also on other factors that affect national leaders' expectancies and values. Relevant other factors include the extent to which the nations are dependent on exchange relations with each other and the relative power of the two sides. Mutual reciprocity is most likely when there is a high and balanced level of exchange and when the power of the two sides is about equal.

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Models of Responsiveness: The Lausanne Peace Negotiations (1922–1923)

Cited by 13 publications

References 4 publications

Simulating the Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-1923: Power Asymmetries in Bargaining

Simulating the Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-1923: Power Asymmetries in Bargaining

Innovations in Doing Conflict Research: The Legacy of Daniel Druckman

When Does Reciprocity in the Actions of Nations Occur?

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