Modelling ourselves: what the free energy principle reveals about our implicit notions of representation

Abstract

Predictive processing theories are increasingly popular in philosophy of mind; such process theories often gain support from the Free Energy Principle (FEP)—a normative principle for adaptive self-organized systems. Yet there is a current and much discussed debate about conflicting philosophical interpretations of FEP, e.g., representational versus non-representational. Here we argue that these different interpretations depend on implicit assumptions about what qualifies (or fails to qualify) as representational. We deploy the Free Energy Principle (FEP) instrumentally to distinguish four main notions of representation, which focus on organizational, structural, content-related and functional aspects, respectively. The various ways that these different aspects matter in arriving at representational or non-representational interpretations of the Free Energy Principle are discussed. We also discuss how the Free Energy Principle may be seen as a unified view where terms that traditionally belong to different ontologies—e.g., notions of model and expectation versus notions of autopoiesis and synchronization—can be harmonized. However, rather than attempting to settle the representationalist versus non-representationalist debate and reveal something about what representations are simpliciter, this paper demonstrates how the Free Energy Principle may be used to reveal something about those partaking in the debate; namely, what our hidden assumptions about what representations are—assumptions that act as sometimes antithetical starting points in this persistent philosophical debate.

A continuum of intentionality: linking the biogenic and anthropogenic approaches to cognition

“…Thus, it is the increased hierarchical organization of temporally deep models that allows for the increased decoupling of such models from the direct influence of the environment and immediate behaviour. 16 Since there are plausible reasons to interpret internal models in representational terms (see Rosen 1985Rosen /2012Sims and Pezzulo 2021), increased representational complexity can be understood as increased model complexity (i.e., increased temporal depth). It is in the notion of temporal depth that the measure of future-oriented-ness is grounded.…”

“…Thus, reasoning from biological need to future-oriented representational content. On one understanding of representations, they function as stand-ins for absent targets (van Gelder 1995;Pezzulo 2008;Sims and Pezzulo 2021). Accordingly, accounting for simple reflex-like responses do not require representational explanation because the mechanisms with which reflexes are produced are purely reactive and sustained by external stimuli; reflex profiles are caused by specific aspects of detected stimuli (i.e., stimulus kind, strength, and/or duration) in the presence of that stimuli.…”

Teleosemantics and the free energy principle

“…Our analysis points to various lines of further research. For example, there is an active debate concerning whether or not the free energy principle should be given a representational reading (Gładziejewski 2016;Gładziejewski and Miłkowski 2017;Kiefer and Hohwy 2018), or if it should be understood in enactivist (anti-representational) terms (Ramstead et al 2021;Gallagher and Allen 2018;Sims and Pezzulo 2021). The congruence with teleosemantics here suggests a representational reading.…”

Many Paths to Anticipatory Behavior: Anticipatory Model Acquisition Across Phylogenetic and Ontogenetic Timescales

“…One answer that has been suggested by numerous scholars is that AB requires that organisms instantiate internal anticipatory models, the structure of which simultaneously captures the structure of the organism's environment and the manner in which the organism's actions affect both it and its environment (Rosen 1985(Rosen /2011Tagkopoulos et al 2008;Friston et al 2010Friston et al , 2019Louie 2010Louie , 2012Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019;Levin 2019;Corcoran et al 2020;Sims 2021;Sims and Pezzulo 2021). In acquiring an anticipatory model, organisms may exploit such models to guide anticipatory adaptive control, preparing for resource fluctuations or mounting defensive responses prior to encountering a threat.…”