Teleosemantics and the free energy principle

Mann, Stephen Francis; Pain, Ross

doi:10.1007/s10539-022-09868-9

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 42 publications

(32 reference statements)

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“…If one takes an instrumentalist view of the FEP, where the free energy minimization is thought of as a useful interpretation of a system’s behavior, the two approaches are clearly conceptually compatible. The theories might still be compatible under a realist interpretation, perhaps particularly if computational processes, which in IIT are normally not considered real, could be identified as causally integrated (and therefore real) mechanisms; however, some justifications for realist interpretations of the FEP often rest on extrinsic accounts of realism, as for example when based in representationalism [ 30 ] or contribution to objective goals [ 29 ]. Ontological commitments are in general stronger and more deliberate within IIT, which means that a conceptual compatibility between the two approaches might ultimately depend on which of the different possible ontological stances compatible with the FEP one chooses to commit to.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Finally, it is important to point out that work based in the FEP and active inference often take an instrumentalist approach, only claiming that some given systems can be described as if it performs active inference [25]. There is, however, an ongoing discussion regarding the degree to which a realist interpretation of the computationalist constructs of the FEP is warranted [26][27][28], and it is argued that the FEP and active inference are compatible with other justifications for computational and representational realism, like mechanical accounts of computation [29] and teleosemantics [30].…”

Section: The Free Energy Principle (Fep)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Phi fluctuates with surprisal: An empirical pre-study for the synthesis of the free energy principle and integrated information theory

Lundbak Olesen,

Waade,

Albantakis

et al. 2023

PLoS Comput Biol

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The Free Energy Principle (FEP) and Integrated Information Theory (IIT) are two ambitious theoretical approaches. The first aims to make a formal framework for describing self-organizing and life-like systems in general, and the second attempts a mathematical theory of conscious experience based on the intrinsic properties of a system. They are each concerned with complementary aspects of the properties of systems, one with life and behavior, the other with meaning and experience, so combining them has potential for scientific value. In this paper, we take a first step towards such a synthesis by expanding on the results of an earlier published evolutionary simulation study, which show a relationship between IIT-measures and fitness in differing complexities of tasks. We relate a basic information theoretic measure from the FEP, surprisal, to this result, finding that the surprisal of simulated agents’ observations is inversely related to the general increase in fitness and integration over evolutionary time. Moreover, surprisal fluctuates together with IIT-based consciousness measures in within-trial time. This suggests that the consciousness measures used in IIT indirectly depend on the relation between the agent and the external world, and that it should therefore be possible to relate them to the theoretical concepts used in the FEP. Lastly, we suggest a future approach for investigating this relationship empirically.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Free Energy Principle (Fep)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Phi fluctuates with surprisal: An empirical pre-study for the synthesis of the free energy principle and integrated information theory

Lundbak Olesen,

Waade,

Albantakis

et al. 2023

PLoS Comput Biol

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“… 2 Mann and Pain (2022) note that the FEP is somewhat obscure in its meaning. The term “energy” in FEP “is not energy in the standard sense.…”

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confidence: 99%

Surprise! Why enactivism and predictive processing are parting ways: The case of improvisation

Gallagher

2022

Possibility Studies & Society

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Can we explain how the various factors of knowledge, skill, habit, environmental constraints and affordances interact or integrate in improvisational performance? In attempting to explain how this integration takes place, I’ll consider two possible approaches: predictive processing (PP) and enactivism. I’ll argue that PP, which, on a neuroscientific view, conceives of the mind as set up to avoid surprise, will not be able to explain improvisation if it remains true to its own principles. In contrast, I’ll argue, enactivism, as a form of embodied cognition that takes the explanatory unit to be the brain-body environment, can offer a better explanation of improvisation. I’ll also argue that the notion of habit is central to this account.

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Teleosemantics, Structural Resemblance and Predictive Processing

Pain,

Mann

2024

Erkenn

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We propose a pluralist account of content for predictive processing systems. Our pluralism combines Millikan’s teleosemantics with existing structural resemblance accounts. The paper has two goals. First, we outline how a teleosemantic treatment of signal passing in predictive processing systems would work, and how it integrates with structural resemblance accounts. We show that the core explanatory motivations and conceptual machinery of teleosemantics and predictive processing mesh together well. Second, we argue this pluralist approach expands the range of empirical cases to which the predictive processing framework might be successfully applied. This is because our pluralism is practice-oriented. A range of different notions of content are used in the cognitive sciences to explain behaviour, and some of these cases look to employ teleosemantic notions. As a result, our pluralism gives predictive processing the scope to cover these cases.

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Teleosemantics and the free energy principle

Cited by 4 publications

References 42 publications

Phi fluctuates with surprisal: An empirical pre-study for the synthesis of the free energy principle and integrated information theory

Phi fluctuates with surprisal: An empirical pre-study for the synthesis of the free energy principle and integrated information theory

Surprise! Why enactivism and predictive processing are parting ways: The case of improvisation

Teleosemantics, Structural Resemblance and Predictive Processing

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