Modeling Preferences Using Roll Call Votes in Parliamentary Systems

Abstract

Models of ideal point estimation usually build on the assumption of spatial preferences. This ignores legislators' non-policy incentives and is thus likely to produce implausible results for many legislatures. We study this problem in parliamentary systems and develop a model of roll call voting that considers both thepolicyand the non-policy,tacticalincentives of legislators. We go on to show how the relative weight of these policy and tactical incentives is influenced by the identity of the mover and characteristics of the motion. Analyses of two data sets of 2174 roll call votes in German state legislatures and 3295 roll call votes in the British House of Commons result in three main findings. First, we show that tactical incentives may be more important than policy incentives, and second, that the importance of tactical incentives varies with the importance of motions. Third, there are interesting twists: backbench private members' bills may reverse tactical incentives whereas proposals from anti-system parties are virtually always rejected by moderate parties, rendering these votes uninformative. Our findings have implications for ideal point estimation in parliamentary systems, as well as for research on separation of power systems.

Ideology, Grandstanding, and Strategic Party Disloyalty in the British Parliament

“…11 A list of party-switchers can be found in Appendix F. Others have suggested that voting patterns may differ depending on the nature of the division, when it occurs within the parliamentary agenda (Bräuninger, Müller and Stecker 2016;Coman 2012), and whether a vote is recorded (Hug 2010). 12 Using the extensive division titles provided by www.theyworkforyou.com for the later period of our study (2005)(2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013)(2014)(2015) we identify where and 12 Recent advances in the literature on roll call votes have focussed on analysing and accounting for selection effects (Carrubba, Gabel and Hug 2008;Hug 2010;Rosas, Shomer and Haptonstahl 2015).…”

When National Unity Governments are neither National, United, nor Governments: The Case of Tunisia

“…The ideal point model's purpose is to compress the large amount of roll-call votes in a parliament down into a single-dimensional score that can represent each legislator's political position relative to every other legislator. In our case, we examine party-level and cleavagelevel ideal points rather than individual ideal points as most of the variation in ideal points in parliamentary systems happens at the party level rather than the individual level (Bräuninger, Müller, and Stecker 2016).…”

Submissive Lobby Fodder or Assertive Political Actors? Party Loyalty of Career Politicians in the UK House of Commons, 2005–15

“…The two rival theories, as advanced in the relevant literature and formalized above, remain largely silent on the role of ideology in career politicians' voting behavior. Their focus on the strategic (or “non‐spatial”) motivation for legislative behavior can, in part, be justified by the recurring finding that nonideological considerations often play a more important role in voting behavior in parliamentary systems (e.g., Bräuninger, Müller, and Stecker ; Dewan and Spirling ; Kam , ). To paint a more complete picture of the behavioral incentives of career and non‐career politicians, however, I also consider a preference‐based explanatory account.…”