Modeling Option and Strategy Choices with Connectionist Networks: Towards an Integrative Model of Automatic and Deliberate Decision Making

Glöckner, Andreas; Betsch, Tilmann

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1090866

Cited by 135 publications

(286 citation statements)

References 94 publications

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“…Nevertheless, only such models that predict choices based on weighted additive information integration and systematic differences in decision times and confidence judgments can account for our findings. Particularly, the results nicely fit predictions derived from connectionist models of decision making (Betsch, 2005;Thagard & Millgram, 1995;Simon et al, 2004;Glöckner, 2006;Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). They are also in line with some evidence accumulation models (e.g., Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993;Usher & McClelland, 2004).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 82%

“…Beyond this general framework, several models have been proposed that specify the functioning of automatic processes (e.g., Beach & Mitchell, 1996;Betsch, 2007;Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993;Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999;Epstein, 1990;Frederick, 2002;Glöckner, 2006;Glöckner & Betsch, 2008;Hogarth, 2001;Lieberman, 2000;Simon, Snow, & Read, 2004;Sloman, 2002). It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss and compare these models.…”

Section: The Neglected Role Of Automatic Processes In Research On Decmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Multiple-reason decision making based on automatic processing.

Glöckner¹,

Betsch²

2008

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni

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It has been repeatedly shown that in decisions under time constraints, individuals predominantly use noncompensatory strategies rather than complex compensatory ones. The authors argue that these findings might be due not to limitations of cognitive capacity but instead to limitations of information search imposed by the commonly used experimental tool Mouselab (J. W. Payne, J. R. Bettman, & E. J. Johnson, 1988). The authors tested this assumption in 3 experiments. In the 1st experiment, information was openly presented, whereas in the 2nd experiment, the standard Mouselab program was used under different time limits. The results indicate that individuals are able to compute weighted additive decision strategies extremely quickly if information search is not restricted by the experimental procedure. In a 3rd experiment, these results were replicated using more complex decision tasks, and the major alternative explanations that individuals use more complex heuristics or that they merely encode the constellation of cues were ruled out. In sum, the findings challenge the fundaments of bounded rationality and highlight the importance of automatic processes in decision making.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 82%

Section: The Neglected Role Of Automatic Processes In Research On Decmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiple-reason decision making based on automatic processing.

Glöckner¹,

Betsch²

2008

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni

Self Cite

198

231

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Our research empirically tests and expands this intriguing theory. In line with Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, and Pearson (1987) and with recent findings in gambling decisions (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a) and probabilistic inference tasks (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008c) we argue that choices based on intuition approximate a weighted compensatory information integration that can be explained by parallel constraint satisfaction (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b;Simon, Snow, & Read, 2004). Contrary to research that focuses on highlighting the shortcomings in human cognitive capacity, we aim to show empirically that although sometimes being mislead by the context, these processes can enable individuals to make quick choices that approximate a rational solution according to Bayes' theorem, even in rather complex tasks and without knowledge how to deliberately apply it.…”

supporting

confidence: 87%

Base-Rate Respect by Intuition: Approximating Rational Choices in Base-Rate Tasks with Multiple Cues

Glöckner

Dickert

2008

SSRN Journal

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Although intuitive-automatic processes sometimes lead to systematic biases in judgment and choice, in many situations especially this kind of processes enables people to approximate rational choices. In complex base-rate tasks with repeated outcome feedback we observed choices which were in line with the Bayes' solution in 86% of the cases and which were made within a relatively short time (i.e., 2.2 seconds). The results indicate reliance on extremely wellcalibrated intuition. This view is supported by the findings that choice proportions are almost perfectly predicted by posterior probabilities (r = .93), and that error rates, response times and confidence ratings are highly correlated with inconsistency in the provided information. Our results support the hypothesis that parallel constraint satisfaction models may account for the processes underlying intuition and make the application of simple heuristics and deliberate strategies very unlikely. Taking an interdisciplinary perspective, implications for economic and psychological modeling are outlined. Base-rate Neglect and IntuitionTo be successful in a fundamentally uncertain world, individuals have to make a multitude of judgments and decisions based on probabilistic information. Research on judgment and decision making has repeatedly shown systematic biases in probability assessment and in applying the rules of probability (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002;Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982;Reyna, 2004;Slovic, 1987). One of the most prominent and well established findings is individuals' neglect of base-rate probabilities. 1 This has been, for instance, demonstrated in the following task (e.g., Bar-Hillel, 1980): Two cab companies, Blue and Green, operate in a given city. Eighty-five percent of the cabs in the city are Blue, and the remaining 15% are Green. A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. A witness later identified the cab as a Green cab. The court tested the witness' ability to distinguish between Blue and Green cabs under nighttime visibility conditions. The witness was able to identify each color correctly about 80% of the time, but confused it with the other color about 20% of the time. What is the probability that the accident was caused by the Green company?To answer this question, both the base rate of green cabs (15%) and the validity of the eyewitness (80%) have to be taken into account. However, most people consider only the latter and give the answer that signals neglect of the base rate, namely 80%. There have been several attempts to explain base-rate neglect and to provide solutions to solve the problem (for an overview see Barbey & Sloman, 2007). In line with earlier approaches (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), Barbey and Sloman proposed that base-rate neglect is due to associative / intuitive (i.e., system 1) judgment strategies that fail to adequately represent the structure of the problem. Our research empirically tests and expands this intriguing theory. In line with Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, and Pearson (...

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“…I am merely suggesting bearing in mind and appropriately acknowledging the evidence sketched above, which, interpreted leniently, can be summarized as follows: No matter how ecologically rational the recognition heuristic often is, pervasive reliance on this strategy is observable only under a very limited set of circumstances. Moreover, whereas the recognition heuristic is indubitably & Townsend, 1993;Dougherty, Gettys, & Odgen, 1999;Glöckner, 2008;Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b;Glöckner & Herbold, in press;Holyoak & Simon, 1999;Juslin & Olsson, 2004;Juslin & Persson, 2002; for a recent review, see also Glöckner & Witteman, 2010), which allow for information integration without imposing severe information processing costs. In this very vein, Newell and Bröder have concluded that "complex process[es] do not necessarily imply the consumption of conscious resources or much processing time and viewed from this perspective, 'simple' heuristics are probably not much simpler, subjectively than complex ones" (2008, p. 201).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%