2021
DOI: 10.3389/fenrg.2021.649097
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Modeling Interprovincial Cooperative Carbon Reduction in China: An Electricity Generation Perspective

Abstract: As the world faces great challenges from climate change, carbon reduction has become China’s basic national policy. However, as the main model for carbon reduction in China, the non-cooperative carbon reduction model (NCCRM) is a simple regulation mode, which is not beneficial for optimization of electricity generation capacity structure and cannot effectively motivate carbon reduction at the provincial level. Therefore, we propose an interprovincial cooperative carbon reduction model (CCRM) from the perspecti… Show more

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Cited by 9 publications
(2 citation statements)
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References 48 publications
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“…In addition to cost and revenue, there are articles using Shapley value to allocate air pollutants or CO 2 emissions. These articles cover the following issues: allocating carbon emissions to four key influencing factors of carbon emissions (e.g., population and economic output) to obtain the influence degree of each factor on carbon emissions (Yu et al, 2012); allocating carbon emission allowances in eight regions of China (Zhang et al, 2014;Chang et al, 2016); allocating CO 2 emissions from refineries across all products (Pierru, 2007); and analyzing the inter-region cooperation in carbon emission reduction problem in China (Zeng et al, 2021).…”
Section: Literature Related To Cooperative Game Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition to cost and revenue, there are articles using Shapley value to allocate air pollutants or CO 2 emissions. These articles cover the following issues: allocating carbon emissions to four key influencing factors of carbon emissions (e.g., population and economic output) to obtain the influence degree of each factor on carbon emissions (Yu et al, 2012); allocating carbon emission allowances in eight regions of China (Zhang et al, 2014;Chang et al, 2016); allocating CO 2 emissions from refineries across all products (Pierru, 2007); and analyzing the inter-region cooperation in carbon emission reduction problem in China (Zeng et al, 2021).…”
Section: Literature Related To Cooperative Game Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…At the same time, the indivisibility of the regional environment (negative externality) and the sharing of governance benefits (positive externality) necessitate breaking the original “fragmented” governance pattern of local governments based on traditional administrative jurisdictions. Given the characteristics of China’s social and economic practices, reducing carbon dioxide emissions through regional alliance cooperation in emission reduction is clearly preferable and is also more consistent with the future development trend [ 6 ].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%