In this study, we introduced the realistic problem of a dynamic carbon tax, built several evolutionary game models for cooperative emission reduction by local governments, and determined the factors that influence governments’ willingness to cooperate in emission reduction. The findings revealed that, first, the probability of governments opting for cooperative emission reduction strategies increases at different rates depending on the benefits and costs of cooperation. Second, externalities influence governments’ willingness to cooperate in emission reduction during cooperative carbon emission reduction. Furthermore, the emergence of a free-riding situation reduces the effectiveness of intergovernmental cooperation in reducing carbon emissions. Third, carbon tax policy can influence the likelihood that local governments will choose cooperative emission reduction, and different carbon tax sizes have different effects on their willingness to choose cooperative emission reduction.
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