Modeling Individual Tacit Coordination Abilities

2022

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Previously, it was shown that some people are better coordinators than others; however, the relative weight of intuitive (system 1) versus deliberate (system 2) modes of thinking in tacit coordination tasks is still not resolved. To address this question, we have extracted an electrophysiological index, the theta-beta ratio (TBR), from the Electroencephalography (EEG) recorded from participants while they were engaged in a semantic coordination task. Results have shown that individual coordination ability, game difficulty and response time are each positively correlated with cognitive load. These results suggest that better coordinators rely more on complex thought process and on more deliberate thinking while coordinating. The model we have presented may be used for the assessment of the depth of reasoning individuals engage in when facing different tasks requiring different degrees of allocation of resources. The findings as well as future research directions are discussed.

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 73%

An Electrophysiological Model for Assessing Cognitive Load in Tacit Coordination Games

2022

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“…The adaptive agent also outperformed the human players (see Figure 2 and Figure 3 ). This advantage of the adaptive agent may be explained by previous findings showing that there is a large range of tacit coordination ability levels among human players (e.g., [ 24 , 39 , 40 , 41 ]). Therefore, it is not surprising that the adaptive agent, which makes decisions that are dictated by a probabilistic model, outperforms the human players comprising strong but also weak and mediocre coordinators.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Using a Stochastic Agent Model to Optimize Performance in Divergent Interest Tacit Coordination Games

2020

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In recent years collaborative robots have become major market drivers in industry 5.0, which aims to incorporate them alongside humans in a wide array of settings ranging from welding to rehabilitation. Improving human–machine collaboration entails using computational algorithms that will save processing as well as communication cost. In this study we have constructed an agent that can choose when to cooperate using an optimal strategy. The agent was designed to operate in the context of divergent interest tacit coordination games in which communication between the players is not possible and the payoff is not symmetric. The agent’s model was based on a behavioral model that can predict the probability of a player converging on prominent solutions with salient features (e.g., focal points) based on the player’s Social Value Orientation (SVO) and the specific game features. The SVO theory pertains to the preferences of decision makers when allocating joint resources between themselves and another player in the context of behavioral game theory. The agent selected stochastically between one of two possible policies, a greedy or a cooperative policy, based on the probability of a player to converge on a focal point. The distribution of the number of points obtained by the autonomous agent incorporating the SVO in the model was better than the results obtained by the human players who played against each other (i.e., the distribution associated with the agent had a higher mean value). Moreover, the distribution of points gained by the agent was better than any of the separate strategies the agent could choose from, namely, always choosing a greedy or a focal point solution. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to construct an intelligent agent that maximizes its utility by incorporating the belief system of the player in the context of tacit bargaining. This reward-maximizing strategy selection process based on the SVO can also be potentially applied in other human–machine contexts, including multiagent systems.

“…The findings of our study suggest several avenues for future research. For example, previous studies have shown that various features such as culture [ 44 , 45 ], social value orientation [ 46 , 47 ], strategic profile [ 48 , 49 ], and loss aversion [ 50 , 51 ] might bias decision-making in tacit coordination games. Therefore, it will be interesting to investigate the effect of these parameters on EEG indices.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Level-K Classification from EEG Signals Using Transfer Learning

2021

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Tacit coordination games are games in which communication between the players is not allowed or not possible. In these games, the more salient solutions, that are often perceived as more prominent, are referred to as focal points. The level-k model states that players’ decisions in tacit coordination games are a consequence of applying different decision rules at different depths of reasoning (level-k). A player at Lk=0 will randomly pick a solution, whereas a Lk≥1 player will apply their strategy based on their beliefs regarding the actions of the other players. The goal of this study was to examine, for the first time, the neural correlates of different reasoning levels in tacit coordination games. To that end, we have designed a combined behavioral-electrophysiological study with 3 different conditions, each resembling a different depth reasoning state: (1) resting state, (2) picking, and (3) coordination. By utilizing transfer learning and deep learning, we were able to achieve a precision of almost 100% (99.49%) for the resting-state condition, while for the picking and coordination conditions, the precision was 69.53% and 72.44%, respectively. The application of these findings and related future research options are discussed.