Modeling and Analysis of Sharing Ratio Enforcement in Private BitTorrent Communities

Abstract

Providing incentives for user contribution has been one of the primary design goals of Peer-to-Peer systems. The newly-emerged BitTorrent private communities adopt Sharing Ratio Enforcement (SRE) on top of BitTorrent's incentive mechanism, Tit-For-Tat, in order to strictly enforce a minimum contribution a member has to provide, in relation to the amount of service it has received.In this paper, we provide a theoretical model to analyze 1) how SRE provides seeding incentives, and 2) how SRE influences the download performance in the system. Specifically, we study the influence of the SRE threshold (i.e., the minimum sharing ratio requirement) and the bandwidth heterogeneity of the peers in the system. In our analysis, we assume users to be rational, i.e., peers seed only the minimum amount required by SRE, and we show that the download performance as predicted by our model represents a lower bound for the actual performance that can be reached in a BitTorrent private community. Hence, following our model, community administrators can predict the minimum performance level their systems will be able to reach.

Fast download but eternal seeding: The reward and punishment of Sharing Ratio Enforcement

“…5(a)). This result is consistent with our previous work [13] where we show that high-capacity peers manage to upload considerably more during the leeching process, and thus need to seed for shorter times. Meanwhile, consistent with our earlier model result, Fig.…”