Model Checking Ad Hoc Network Routing Protocols: ARAN vs. endairA

Benetti, Davide; Merro, Massimo; Vigan, Luca

doi:10.1109/sefm.2010.24

Cited by 23 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 26 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Several case studies have also been conducted. For example, D. Benetti et al [10] have analyzed the ARAN and endairA protocols with the AVISPA tool, considering a finite number of scenarios. G.Ács et al [3] have developed a framework for analyzing the distance vector routing protocols SAODV and ARAN.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysing Routing Protocols: Four Nodes Topologies Are Sufficient

Cortier

Degrieck

Delaune

2012

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. Routing protocols aim at establishing a route between nodes on a network. Secured versions of routing protocols have been proposed in order to provide more guarantees on the resulting routes. Formal methods have proved their usefulness when analysing standard security protocols such as confidentiality or authentication protocols. However, existing results and tools do not apply to routing protocols. This is due in particular to the fact that all possible topologies (infinitely many) have to be considered.In this paper, we propose a simple reduction result: when looking for attacks on properties such as the validity of the route, it is sufficient to consider topologies with only four nodes, resulting in a number of just five distinct topologies to consider. As an application, we analyse the SRP applied to DSR and the SDMSR protocols using the ProVerif tool.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysing Routing Protocols: Four Nodes Topologies Are Sufficient

Cortier

Degrieck

Delaune

2012

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…There have been attempts to develop formal methods to prove routing protocols secure . Model checking methods study the global state space of the protocol and develop tools to determine whether a sequence of sending or receiving message can lead to a successful attack by the attacker. If a protocol is insecure, model checking tools can discover counterexamples.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A new method to deduce counterexamples in secure routing protocols based on strand space model

Dong

Yang

Sheng

et al. 2016

Security Comm Networks

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Strand space model, an excellent formal analysis method, is still not effective enough when it is used to analyze ad hoc routing protocols. Counterexamples cannot be deduced directly if a protocol is proved insecure by strand space model. Based on backward reasoning and strand space model, an attack analysis method is proposed to find all possible attacks that cause nonexistent routes to be accepted. To begin with, a nonexistent route is assumed to be accepted by a routing protocol. Then, to decrease the complexity of analysis, an adversarial node abstraction process is carried out to make all the intermediate nodes in the nonexistent route turn into normal nodes. Furthermore, a combined analysis of strand space model and cross‐route attack is carried on the route reply phase of the routing protocol. Finally, all possible attacks that lead to the nonexistent route can be deduced after combined analyzing of the route request phase. Then, we take endairA—a classic secure routing protocol in ad hoc networks—as an example to verify the correctness and effectiveness of the new method. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

show abstract

“…This can be split into the analysis of the integrity of network nodes on the one hand and the analysis of the integrity of process control units on the other. Techniques related to IP traceback [9,10,11,12,13,14] have been proposed to help solve this kind of problem in the context of denial of service attacks and such techniques are easily adaptable to this problem, particularly for probabilistic cases [15]. In [2], this requires demonstrating the existence of independent routes and then considering their consistency in terms of the model to determine route integrity.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Defeating Node Based Attacks on SCADA Systems Using Probabilistic Packet Observation

McEvoy

Wolthusen

2013

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems form a vital part of the critical infrastructure. Such systems are subject to sophisticated attacks by subverted processes which can manipulate message content or forge authentic messages, undermining the action of the plant, whilst hiding the effects from operators. In this paper, we propose a novel network protocol which, using techniques related to IP Traceback, enables the efficient discovery of subverted nodes, assuming an initial detection event. We discuss its advantages over previous techniques in this area and provide a formal model.

show abstract

Model Checking Ad Hoc Network Routing Protocols: ARAN vs. endairA

Cited by 23 publications

References 26 publications

Analysing Routing Protocols: Four Nodes Topologies Are Sufficient

Analysing Routing Protocols: Four Nodes Topologies Are Sufficient

A new method to deduce counterexamples in secure routing protocols based on strand space model

Defeating Node Based Attacks on SCADA Systems Using Probabilistic Packet Observation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About