A new method to deduce counterexamples in secure routing protocols based on strand space model

Abstract

Strand space model, an excellent formal analysis method, is still not effective enough when it is used to analyze ad hoc routing protocols. Counterexamples cannot be deduced directly if a protocol is proved insecure by strand space model. Based on backward reasoning and strand space model, an attack analysis method is proposed to find all possible attacks that cause nonexistent routes to be accepted. To begin with, a nonexistent route is assumed to be accepted by a routing protocol. Then, to decrease the complexity of analysis, an adversarial node abstraction process is carried out to make all the intermediate nodes in the nonexistent route turn into normal nodes. Furthermore, a combined analysis of strand space model and cross‐route attack is carried on the route reply phase of the routing protocol. Finally, all possible attacks that lead to the nonexistent route can be deduced after combined analyzing of the route request phase. Then, we take endairA—a classic secure routing protocol in ad hoc networks—as an example to verify the correctness and effectiveness of the new method. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.