Mode-Level vs. Implementation-Level Physical Security in Symmetric Cryptography

Bellizia, Davide; Bronchain, Olivier; Cassiers, Gaëtan; Grosso, Vincent; Guo, Chun; Momin, Charles; Pereira, Olivier; Peters, Thomas; Standaert, François‐Xavier

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-56784-2_13

Cited by 26 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 78 publications

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“…We summarize and discuss implementation security and efficient implementations in Sect. 7. Finally, we conclude in Sect.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 85%

“…As a result, masked software implementations of Ascon result in a performance penalty with low overhead. Additionally, leveled implementations of Ascon are possible to improve the robustness and/or security of the design [4,7]. Examples are side-channel protected implementations with different strength of the key XORs, p a and/or p b .…”

Section: Implementation Security and Robustnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Next, we give a list of papers that either evaluate the side-channel and fault resistance of Ascon or elaborate protection mechanisms against side-channel and fault attacks [4,7,12,[28][29][30]50,51,55,60,68,[77][78][79]83].…”

Section: Implementation Security and Robustnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, even if an attacker somehow manages to recover an internal state during data processing (e.g., due to side-channel attacks), this does not directly lead to the recovery of the secret key or to constructing forgeries without significant additional computations. Besides increasing the robustness of any implementation, this also allows more efficient protection against side-channel attacks such as differential power analysis (DPA) attacks with leveled implementations [4,7]: In masked implementations, it can be sufficient that the initialization and finalization provides high robustness against side-channel analysis, whereas the bulk data can be processed at higher speed with a lower protection level. Thanks to Ascon's low-degree S-box, masked implementations induce only a relatively small overhead in hardware and software [75], so it is feasible to include protection on constrained devices.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ascon v1.2: Lightweight Authenticated Encryption and Hashing

et al. 2021

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Authenticated encryption satisfies the basic need for authenticity and confidentiality in our information infrastructure. In this paper, we provide the specification of Ascon-128 and Ascon-128a. Both authenticated encryption algorithms provide efficient authenticated encryption on resource-constrained devices and on high-end CPUs. Furthermore, they have been selected as the “primary choice” for lightweight authenticated encryption in the final portfolio of the CAESAR competition. In addition, we specify the hash function Ascon-Hash, and the extendable output function Ascon-Xof. Moreover, we complement the specification by providing a detailed overview of existing cryptanalysis and implementation results.

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“…We summarize and discuss implementation security and efficient implementations in Sect. 7. Finally, we conclude in Sect.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 85%

Section: Implementation Security and Robustnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Implementation Security and Robustnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ascon v1.2: Lightweight Authenticated Encryption and Hashing

et al. 2021

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“…Related Work. Two NIST LWC finalists, Ascon [21] and ISAP [22], have been shown to have nonce-misuse resilient privacy and misuse resistant authenticity [23,24]. NMRL security has been shown for a 2nd-round candidate Spook [25].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nonce‐misuse resilience of Romulus‐N and GIFT‐COFB

Inoue

Guo

Minematsu

2023

IET Information Security

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Nonce‐misuse resilience (NMRL) security of Romulus‐N and GIFT‐COFB is analysed, the two finalists of NIST Lightweight Cryptography project for standardising lightweight authenticated encryption. NMRL, introduced by Ashur et al. at CRYPTO 2017, is a relaxed security notion from a stronger, nonce‐misuse resistance notion. The authors have proved that Romulus‐N and GIFT‐ COFB have nonce‐misuse resilience. For Romulus‐N, the perfect privacy (NMRL‐PRIV) and n/2‐bit authenticity (NMRL‐AUTH) with graceful degradation with respect to nonce repetition are showed. For GIFT‐COFB, n/4‐bit security for both NMRL‐PRIV and NMRL‐AUTH notions is showed.

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