Modalities of Civil-Military Stability in Africa

Abstract

If during the 1960s the coup d'état emerged as the most visible and recurrent characteristic of the African political experience, by the 1980s quasi-permanent military rule, of whatever ideological hue, had become the norm for much of the continent. At any moment in time, up to 65 per cent of all Africa's inhabitants and well over half its states are governed by military administrators. Civilian rule is but a distant memory in some countries. Few at some stage or another have not been run by an armed-forces junta, and fewer still have not been rocked at least once by an attempted coup, putsch, or military-sponsored plot. According to one tabulation, ‘only six states have not witnessed some form of extra-legal armed involvement in national politics since 1958’.1 The phenomenon has even reached the non-state Homelands of Bophuthatswana, Transkei, and Ciskei in South Africa. Rule by civilians is very much the statistical ‘deviation’ from the continental norm, as military leaders lay a permanent claim to the political throne in much of Africa

Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations1

“…Similarly, the primary criteria for the promotion of officers in coup‐proof states are affiliation and loyalty—not merit, skill, or expertise. Seyni Kountché, who ruled Niger from 1974 to 1987, for instance, placed his cousins in charge of both the armed forces and the competing Praetorian Guard (Decalo 1989:564).…”

“…16 16 More specifically, for the Philippines, for example, Lee (2008); for Mali, for example, Decalo (1989:562); for Portugal, for example, Wheeler (2003:124); for Cuba, for example, Goure (1989); for South Africa, for example, Howe (1994:46) and Ellis (1998:209); for Italy, for example, Mondini (2006:457); for China, for example, Liu (1979:829); for Ivory Coast, for example, N’Diaye (1999); for Niger, for example, Decalo (1989:563); and for Thailand, for example, Heginbotham (2002). …”

¿Quién Manda a Quién?: Los militares en la Política de Nigeria1

“…Ante esta realidad, luego de la independencia fueron implementados en los países africanos diferentes mecanismos de neutralización de la injerencia política de las fuerzas armadas. Decalo (1989) sintetiza éstos en tres tipos: primero, un garante externo, es decir, una potencia internacional con una importante inluencia local garantiza la continuidad del régimen civil p.ej. Francia en Costa de Maril, Gabón, Senegal, Camerún); segundo, la compensación, modalidad en donde la autoridad civil otorga prebendas a los oiciales militares más inluyentes a in de que éstos mantengan a los soldados en sus cuarteles (p.ej.…”

The Soldier and the State in the Congo Crisis: The Unprofessional Legacy of the National Congolese Army

“…50 This article will explore the gap left by this literature in the specific context of the Congo by examining the development of the Congolese military during the Congo Crisis, tracing its growth directly from a colonial force into a national military alongside its ascendancy to political takeover under General Mobutu. It will return to the idea that militaries are important for civilmilitary relations by examining how an unprofessional military (assessed against Huntington's criteria for professionalism) can be a driver of civilmilitary instability, just as professionalism can be a driver of stability.…”