Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations¹

Abstract

The existing literature on military effectiveness established the robust claim that democracies are more successful and effective in winning interstate wars. One mechanism that explains this relationship heavily draws upon the underlying effect of regime type on civil–military relations. Still, this relationship has not yet been explored systematically, and rigorous empirical research on this issue remains surprisingly scarce. In order to address this shortcoming, this study investigates the patterns of civil–military relations according to different regime types, that is, democracies and nondemocracies. More specifically, the authors examine whether and how democracies invest in coup‐proofing, that is, strategies employed to prevent the military from seizing power. The main argument is derived from a principal‐agent logic and claims that coup‐proofing is both a relatively less attractive and necessary instrument for democratic principals. By analyzing newly compiled time‐series cross‐sectional data on states’ coup‐proofing efforts in 1975–1999, the core hypothesis is tested in a quantitative framework.

Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships

“…First, a large number of scholars argue that a political leader who faces high threats of coups imposed by strong elites is more likely to attempt to diminish the elites' coup-making capabilities. As the likelihood that the military and other elites will attempt a 3 coup increases, the dictator is more inclined to diminish their capabilities to organize a coup by purging strong and competent officers (e.g., Stepan, 1971;Horowitz, 1985;Finer, 1988;Pollack, 1996;Belkin & Schofer, 2003, 2005Pilster & Bohmelt, 2011). In other words, a dictator who faces a high coup risk tends to employ "coup-proofing" strategies in the form of purges and political replacement of military officers and other elites to reduce his coup risk (Biddle & Zirkle, 1996;Quinlivan, 1999;Roessler, 2011).…”

Counterbalancing, Spatial Dependence, and Peer Group Effects

“…Therefore, the first set of peers comprises states that share common institutional characteristics that make them particularly prone to coups, i.e., non-democratic regimes. For instance, Pilster and Böhmelt (2012) examine civil-military relations in the form of counterbalancing in both democracies and authoritarian states. Their core argument is based on a "principal-agent logic and claims that coup-proofing is both a relatively less attractive and necessary instrument for democratic principals" (Pilster and Böhmelt 2012: 355).…”

Auxiliary Force Structure: Paramilitary Forces and Progovernment Militias

“…The arguments typically brought forward to explain the existence of either type of a state's auxiliary force focus on greed-based explanations, larger violent cleavages, or systemic-level structural influences such as economic globalization Mitchell, 2016, 2015;Pilster and Böhmelt, 2012;. A joint analysis, addressing both theoretical and empirical aspects in a comprehensive way and that additionally goes beyond linking the establishment of auxiliary forces exclusively to a conflict environment, is missing, however.…”

“…Finally, from a policy perspective, our work should inform decision-makers, public institutions, or think tanks by clarifying how resources might be spent in more effective ways to manage the possible threats of auxiliary forces or what security implications -domestically and internationallystates with a specific auxiliary force structure face. Again, while there are studies focusing explicitly or implicitly on either type (e.g., Mitchell, 2016, 2015;Pilster and Böhmelt, 2012), to the best of our knowledge, we present the first analysis that distinguishes between and examines the emergence of paramilitary forces and pro-government militias in a joint theoretical and empirical framework.…”

“…Correspondingly, auxiliary forces are strongly associated with and likely to emerge out of a domestic threat to the incumbent (Carey, Mitchell and Lowe, 2013;Quinlivan, 1999;Belkin and Schofer, 2003;Pilster and Böhmelt, 2012). 5 Auxiliary forces are thus often put in place due to their supposed effectiveness in addressing domestic threats that regular security units might only be inadequately able to deal with (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010).…”