Mobilizing the Public Against the President: Congress and the Political Costs of Unilateral Action

Abstract

Prior scholarship overlooks the capacity of other actors to raise the political costs of unilateral action by turning public opinion against the president. Through a series of five experiments embedded in nationally representative surveys, we demonstrate Congress's ability to erode support for unilateral actions by raising both constitutional and policy-based objections to the exercise of unilateral power. Congressional challenges to the unilateral president diminish support for executive action across a range of policy areas in both the foreign and domestic realm and are particularly influential when they explicitly argue that presidents are treading on congressional prerogatives. We also find evidence that constitutional challenges are more effective when levied by members of Congress than by other actors. The results resolve a debate in the literature and suggest a mechanism through which Congress might exercise a constraint on the president, even when it is unable to check him legislatively.

The Law “Justice Under the Constitution, Not Over It”: Public Perceptions of FDR’s Court‐Packing Plan

“…However, less than a majority of Democrats supported both responses, and those who discriminated in their attitudes were much more likely to go against Roosevelt’s preferred position. Instead, the data are more consistent with studies that find Americans can have conflicting procedural and substantive preferences on policy debates (Reeves and Rogowski ; Christenson and Kriner ).…”

“…One study found an individual’s commitment to the rule of law and partisan factors affect support for executive action (Reeves and Rogowski ), whereas another found compliance with constitutional rules affects how respondents assess the legitimacy of executive actions (Braman ). According to another set of experiments, public support for executive orders declines when Congress claims the order is unconstitutional and violates the separation of powers (Christenson and Kriner ). If Americans discriminate in their attitudes toward Roosevelt’s policies and tactics, those who support the New Deal and judicial independence should be more likely to support a constitutional amendment than the Court‐packing plan.…”

Policy Durability, Agency Capacity, and Executive Unilateralism

“…The model, however, should be viewed as a baseline model and can be extended in several straightforward ways 16. Though see Lowande and Gray (2017) and Reeves and Rogowski (2015;2018) for evidence of public backlash to unilateral action and Christenson and Kriner (2017a;2017b) for arguments that also involve pushback from Congress or the courts. Insofar as these dynamics push p down, they would have the opposite effect on unilateral action desirability.…”

Policy Making in the Shadow of Executive Action

“…Indeed, there is evidence that these responses become more likely as the scope of the objections in a signing statement increase (Ainsworth, Harwood, and Moffett ). Further, bold usage of the power can also hurt the president’s esteem in the public, as there is evidence of low public support for the use of extraconstitutional powers (Christenson and Kriner ; ; Lowande and Gray ; Reeves and Rogowski ). These costs temper how often the president will use and how far he or she will push the signing statement power.…”