Policy Making in the Shadow of Executive Action

Abstract

Presidents have prerogative powers, such as signing statements, that seemingly undo legislative bargains. Why do legislators commit to bargains within the legislature if the president can unravel those deals? I argue that legislators bargain over both their policy and electoral interests in the face of looming presidential action and that this induces legislators to commit to bargains, even when they know the president will not maintain their agreements. I derive the prediction that signing statements are more likely when congressional polarization is low. I find support for this expectation, using data on polarization and signing statements from 1981 until 2012.

Presidential action and the Supreme Court: The case of signing statements

“…Another extension to the model could require presidents to incur a cost when issuing a signing statement (Moraguez, n.d. ), which can take two forms.…”

“…They are commonly perceived as an effective line item veto, used to nullify sections of the law deemed unconstitutional (Brownell, 1998; Cooper, 2002, 2005, 2007; Evans, 2011). As such, many scholars recognize the ability of presidents to obtain policy gains with these statements, giving them an advantage in the legislative bargaining process (Cutrone, 2008; Kelley and Marshall, 2008, 2009; Moraguez, n.d. ; Rice, 2010; Rodriguez et al, n.d.).…”

“…Some studies find that divided government increases the probability that the president issues a signing statement (Berry, 2009; Kelley and Marshall, 2008, 2009, 2010), while other studies find that divided government has mixed or no effects (Kelley et al, 2013; Ostrander and Sievert, 2012; Sievert and Ostrander, 2017). Yet, some suggest that these relationships should also account for the internal fragmentation of Congress (Kennedy, 2014; Moraguez, n.d.). In addition, scholars have consistently found that presidents are more likely to issue statements on legislation that is significant and related to appropriations or foreign policy (Berry, 2009; Kelley et al, 2013; Kelley and Marshall, 2008, 2009, 2010; Ostrander and Sievert, 2012; Sievert and Ostrander, 2017).…”

“…There is a substantial body of legal literature and some political science studies examining the constitutional issues surrounding this power (Cooper, 2002, 2005; May, 1998; Pfiffner, 2008). Correspondingly, there exist a few theoretical models of signing statements, but they concentrate on presidential–congressional relations (Cutrone, 2008; Kelley and Marshall, 2009; Moraguez, n.d. ; Rodriguez et al, n.d.)…”

“… 7. Additionally, congressional committees increase executive branch oversight in response to signing statements (Ainsworth et al, 2012), providing further evidence that Congress views this tool as a viable means of policy influence through agency implementation. Similarly, Moraguez (n.d.) shows that the prospect of a signing statement shapes congressional negotiations over legislation. …”