Mizrahi and Seidel: Experts in Confusion.

Abstract

In this paper I describe the apparent differences between the views of Mizrahi (2013) and Seidel (2014) on the strength of arguments from expert opinion. I show that most of Seidel's objections rely on an understanding of the words 'expert' and 'opinion' different from those which Mizrahi employs. I also discuss certain inconsistencies found in both papers over the use of these key terms. The paper concludes by noting that Mizrahi is right to suggest that evidence shows expert predictions to be unreliable, but Seidel is correct to observe that this finding should not be used to claim that expert opinion in general is not to be trusted.

Why Arguments from Expert Opinion are still Weak: A Reply to Seidel

“…In another paper that aims to criticize my argument, Hinton (2015) also claims that my use of "expert opinion" is confusing. Like Seidel (2014, pp.…”

Two Types of Argument from Position to Know

“…On the face of it the vulnerable premise is (2), where it may be questioned whether it is: i) true, and; ii) self-undermining since the argument might appear to illegitimately make an exception for expert opinion about expertise while endorsing skepticism about expertise of all other kinds. This has been the main focus of attack and defence so far (Seidel 2014;Hinton 2015;Mizrahi 2016;Seidel 2016). 1 I will argue that the problematic premise is actually (1), which, as it stands, is under-described; Mizrahi is tacitly taking "weak arguments" to be those that do not justify belief for one appealing to expert opinion, where instead weak arguments should be those that do not justify the arguer's holding whatever cognitive attitude is expressed in the opinion.…”

The Real Struggle: An Objective Notion of Expertise?

“…In a paper published in this journal Martin Hinton aims to show that the struggle between Moti Mizrahi and me about whether arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments rests on misunderstandings (Hinton 2015). Let me emphasize that I generally appreciate Hinton's intention to settle the dispute between Mizrahi and myself in this way.…”

“…Hinton mistakenly and despite my explicit criticism of it thinks that I adopt a simple veritistic account of expertise. Furthermore, even if this account is wrong or unconvincing, Hinton has not shown why it is self-contradictory or circular: the fact that Hinton himself sees "the root of [my] confusion" (Hinton 2015, p. 543) in my not taking into account how the term 'expert' is allegedly used in everyday language-"[e]xperts are those paid for their expertise, those who offer apparently expert opinion, those who ought to be experts given their previous experience" (Hinton 2015, p. 544)-does not point to an inconsistency or circularity in my account but to the fact that Hinton disagrees with me about whether 'expert' has to be treated as an objective notion. Claiming that an objective account of expertise is not convincing because it does not take into account the purported everyday use of the term 'expert' is, however, something quite different from being able to show that 'my account' includes inconsistency/self-contradiction or circularity.…”

“…In fact, he simply seems to overlook the two aspects in Kutrovatz's definition and to treat it just as a definition along the lines of attribution of knowledge. 8 8 This fact is even more puzzling once we take into account that Hinton also claims that "[in] everyday use 'expert' refers both to someone who actually knows the answers and someone who is taken to know them" (Hinton 2015, …”