Mixed bundling auctions

Jéhiel, Philippe; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz; Moldovanu, Benny

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.001

Cited by 57 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 17 publications

(24 reference statements)

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“…valuations for the bundle's parts (e.g., Adams & Yellen 1976, Jehiel et al 2007, Armstrong & Vickers 2010. However, several behavioral concepts suggest that a decision maker may exhibit a different valuation for two goods if they are bundled.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bundling Public with Private Goods

Frackenpohl

Pönitzsch

2013

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. i.e., the willingness to pay for the bundle exceeds the willingness to pay for the two separate goods. In contrast, we find no superadditivity in control treatments with only private goods. We discuss several behavioral concepts which are in line with our results as well as implications for fundraisers and firms. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bundling Public with Private Goods

Frackenpohl

Pönitzsch

2013

SSRN Journal

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“…This is not inconsistent with the results in McAfee,McMillan and Whinston (1989) and PhilippeJehiel, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn and Benny Moldovanu (2007). They showed that for "generic" continuous valuation distributions, a monopolist seller's revenue will be higher under mixed bundling in posted price and auction settings respectively.…”

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confidence: 65%

Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods

Fang

Norman

2010

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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This paper studies the optimal provision mechanism for multiple excludable public goods. For a class of problems with symmetric goods and binary valuations, we show that the optimal mechanism involves bundling if a regularity condition, akin to a hazard rate condition, on the distribution of valuations is satisfied. Relative to separate provision mechanisms, the optimal bundling mechanism may increase the asymptotic provision probability of socially efficient public goods from zero to one, and decreases the extent of use exclusions. If the regularity condition is violated, the optimal solution replicates the separate provision outcome for the two-good case. (JEL D82, H41)

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“…This inefficiency will typically vanish as the number of buyers increases. Jehiel, Meyer-Ter-Vehn, and Moldovanu (2007) study auctions with "mixed bundles" and show that they are often revenue superior to no bundling and to pure bundling. Ghosh, Nazerzadeh, and Sundararajan (2007) explore the same question in the context of the digital advertising market.…”

Section: Pricing and Bundlingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Undivide and Conquer: On Selling a Divisible and Homogeneous Good

Levy

Smorodinsky

Tennenholtz³

2015

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

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With the prevalence of cloud computing emerges the challenges of pricing cloud computing services. There are various characteristics of cloud computing which make the problem unique. We study an abstract model which focuses on one such aspect -the sale of a homogeneous and fully divisible good. We cast onto our model the idea of bundling, studied within the context of monopolist pricing of indivisible goods. We demonstrate how selling a divisible good as an indivisible one may increase seller revenues and characterize when this phenomenon occurs, and the corresponding gain factors.

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Mixed bundling auctions

Cited by 57 publications

References 17 publications

Bundling Public with Private Goods

Bundling Public with Private Goods

Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods

Undivide and Conquer: On Selling a Divisible and Homogeneous Good

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