Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods

Fang, Hanming; Norman, Peter

doi:10.1257/mic.2.4.1

Cited by 18 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…In related contexts, other studies already have emphasized the relevance of community heterogeneity on social capital (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000), civic engagement (La Ferrara, 2002;Costa and Kahn, 2003), or the maintenance of irrigation systems (Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, 2002 and valuations for a public good are often exogenously given and cannot be changed. In these cases, if valuations are heterogeneous but private information, one possible solution that has been proposed to increase social welfare is the bundling of (excludable) public goods (Hellwig, 2007;Fang and Norman, 2010). In political decision making, something similar can be observed in the guise of vote trading (logrolling).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Privileged Groups: The Role of Capability and Valuation on Public Goods Provision

Kölle

2012

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in University of CologneJuly 2012 AbstractWe experimentally investigate cooperation in privileged groups which according to Olson (1965) are groups in which at least one member has an incentive to supply a positive amount of the public good. More specifically, we analyze group member heterogeneity with respect to two dimensions: capability and valuation. Our results reveal that with and without punishment opportunities, heterogeneity crucially affects cooperation and coordination within groups. Compared to non-privileged groups, asymmetric valuations for the public good have negative effects, and asymmetric capabilities in providing the public good have positive effects on voluntary contributions. The main reason for these results are the different externalities contributions have on the other group members' payoffs affecting individuals' willingness to cooperate. Hence, whether heterogeneity facilitates or impedes collective action, and whether privileged groups are as privileged as they initially seem is subject to the nature of their asymmetry.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Privileged Groups: The Role of Capability and Valuation on Public Goods Provision

Kölle

2012

SSRN Journal

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“…(However, reach and incremental profit are not monotonic in the number of journals, and ''integer constraints'' for the number of necessary full-price journals appear to play a major role in this.) For further analysis of the binary case, but for welfare-maximizing tariffs rather than profit-maximizing tariffs, see Fang and Norman (2008).…”

Section: Figurementioning

confidence: 99%

Collection Sales: Good or Bad for Journals?

Armstrong

2010

Economic Inquiry

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This paper discusses the impact of collection sales (i.e., the bundling of several journals for sale by publishers to libraries) on journals. The advent of electronic journal distribution implies that bundling is an efficient sales strategy, and can act to extend the reach of a journal. Current arrangements are discussed and shown to lead to tensions between commercial publishers and non-profit journals. The paper argues that non-profit journals should not necessarily abandon collection sales programmes. Rather, non-profit journals may benefit from withdrawing from commercial publishers which distribute their own for-profit journals, and joining together to be distributed by less commercial publishers who set relatively low prices for their collections.

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“…By contrast, we focus on the club-good nature of IP, rather than the fact that the losing participants in a patent auction may experience negative externalities on the final marketplace. In this sense, our work follows a relatively sparse literature on club goods started by Buchanan (1965), with more recent work by Deb and Razzolini (2001), Baik, Kim, and Na (2001), Norman (2004), and Fang and Norman (2010). In this literature, Loertscher and Marx (2017) study optimal pricing mechanisms for intermediaries of club goods.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Patent auctions and bidding coalitions: structuring the sale of club goods

Asker,

Baccara,

Lee

2021

The RAND J of Economics

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Auctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions of buyers. These auctions are distinguished by the good for sale being nonrivalrous, but still excludable, in consumptionthat is, they auctions of club goods. This affects how coalitional bidding impacts auction performance. We study the implications of coalitions of bidders on second-price (or equivalently, ascending-price) auctions. Although the formation of coalitions can benefit the seller, we show that stable coalition profiles tend to consist of excessively large coalitions, to the detriment of both auction revenue and social welfare. Limiting the permitted coalition size increases efficiency and confers benefits on the seller. Lastly, we compare the revenues generated by patent auctions and multilicense auctions, and we find that the latter are superior in a large class of environments.

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Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods

Cited by 18 publications

References 21 publications

Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Privileged Groups: The Role of Capability and Valuation on Public Goods Provision

Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Privileged Groups: The Role of Capability and Valuation on Public Goods Provision

Collection Sales: Good or Bad for Journals?

Patent auctions and bidding coalitions: structuring the sale of club goods

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