Mitigating panic buying behavior in the epidemic: An evolutionary game perspective

Shan, Haiyan; Pi, Wenjie

doi:10.1016/j.jretconser.2023.103364

Cited by 13 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 42 publications

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“…Regarding the relationships between multiple stakeholders in a sudden public crisis event, Shufeng et al [30] found through research that when there are conflicting interests between the government, social organizations, and the public, a systematic approach should be used to focus on the points of conflict of interest among multiple stakeholders and pay attention to the interaction between different stakeholders within the system. Shan et al [31] studied the possible impacts of panic-buying behavior in public health emergencies, such as resource waste, price fluctuations, and unequal distribution of epidemic prevention materials. In addition, applying evolutionary games theory to analyze the optimal strategic choices of different stakeholders (the public, government, and enterprises) can help reduce the likelihood of panic buying.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Analysis of Group Panic Buying in China during the COVID-19 Pandemic

et al. 2023

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With the global outbreak of COVID-19, the panic-buying incidents triggered by the variants of the Omicron strain have severely affected the normal social order. This paper considers the complex interest game and interactive relationship among multiple subjects in the mass-panic buying event caused by rumors and constructs a three-party evolution game model of local government, rumor-monger, and public. The strategy-selection process of each subject based on evolutionary game theory is studied, and the strategy selection of three game subjects in different situations and related influencing factors are analyzed. Taking the example of the montmorillonite powder panic buying caused by the XBB virus strain rumor in China, the evolutionary game model constructed in this study is simulated and analyzed. The study shows that the evolutionary process of the mass panic-buying event is characterized by six stages: the initial stage; the outbreak stage; the spread stage; the climax stage; the relief stage; and the recovery stage. There are four stable points in the evolutionary game of the three game subjects, namely (no intervention, no rumor, no panic buying), (no intervention, rumor, no panic buying), (intervention, no rumor, no panic buying), and (intervention, rumor, no panic buying). The strategy of government intervention will be adjusted according to the strategy selection of the public and the rumor-monger. Under the mechanism of reward and punishment of the higher-level government, increasing the punishment and reward intensity of the higher-level government will promote the local government to intervene in the rumor-mongering event faster, but increasing the reward intensity has a more significant impact on the intervention behavior of the local government than punishment, and increasing punishment intensity has a more significant impact on the non-rumor-mongering behavior of the rumor-monger than reward. The parameters of social risk-bearing cost, risk transmission coefficient, rumor-mongering income and cost, and public drug purchase cost have different degrees of influence on the evolutionary behavior of game subjects. Therefore, this study provides new ideas for effectively responding to mass panic buying events in the context of public emergencies.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Analysis of Group Panic Buying in China during the COVID-19 Pandemic

et al. 2023

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Crowdsourcing solutions for innovation: An evolutionary examination of participant behavior strategy

Wang,

Li,

Zheng

et al. 2024

Manage Decis Econ

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Despite numerous enterprises embracing crowdsourcing to access several innovative solutions, the prevalence of information asymmetry among different participants has led to an increase in the submission of low‐quality solutions and payment disputes. To improve the efficiency of crowdsourcing solutions for innovation, this study aims to employ an evolutionary game model to capture the dynamic interaction and decision‐making process of the requesters, platforms, and solvers. Initially, we dissect the relevant factors influencing the behavioral decisions of participants to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model. Subsequently, we analyze five potential evolutionarily stable strategies and conditions. Ultimately, we simulate the dynamic evolution of participant decision‐making behavior and the sensitivity of related parameters. The simulation results depict that the initial selection probabilities of populations bear no correlation to the system stability, which only influences the time required to reach equilibrium. The participant's behaviors are affected by price, loss, penalty, compensation, cost, and reputation recognition. Reward and punishment mechanisms help effectively mitigate the emergence of free‐riding and collusion. These findings provide important implications for the sustainable development of crowdsourcing solutions for innovation.

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What retail apocalypse? A Delphi forecast of commercial space demand in the Toronto region

Daniel,

Hernandez

2024

Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services

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Mitigating panic buying behavior in the epidemic: An evolutionary game perspective

Cited by 13 publications

References 42 publications

Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Analysis of Group Panic Buying in China during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Analysis of Group Panic Buying in China during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Crowdsourcing solutions for innovation: An evolutionary examination of participant behavior strategy

What retail apocalypse? A Delphi forecast of commercial space demand in the Toronto region

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