2014
DOI: 10.1002/acp.3057
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Misperception of Chance, Conjunction, Belief in the Paranormal and Reality Testing: A Reappraisal

Abstract: SummaryThe present study examined the degree to which specific probabilistic biases (misperception of chance and conjunction fallacy) were associated with belief in the paranormal and proneness to reality testing (RT) deficits. Participants completed measures assessing probabilistic reasoning, belief in the paranormal and RT. Perception of randomness predicted the level of paranormal belief and proneness to RT deficits. These results provide support for the notion that paranormal believers demonstrate greater … Show more

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Cited by 39 publications
(87 citation statements)
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“…In general, this research on psychic beliefs is consistent with studies linking other kinds of paranormal beliefs to less analytic or critical thinking (see Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012;Pennycook, Cheryne, Sleli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012), including less critical evaluation of hypothetical arguments (Stanovich & West, 1998;Svedholm & Lindeman, 2012) or an increased likelihood of endorsing conspiracy theories that most people reject based on careful scrutiny of the evidence (Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013;Lobato, Mendoza, Sims, & Chin, 2014). Although group differences in analytical thinking and logic tasks have not always been observed (compare Dagnall, Drinkwater, Parker, & Rowley, 2014, to Rogers, Davis, & Fisk, 2009, these represent some of the most reliable cognitive difference between paranormal believers and skeptics observed to date.…”
supporting
confidence: 84%
“…In general, this research on psychic beliefs is consistent with studies linking other kinds of paranormal beliefs to less analytic or critical thinking (see Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012;Pennycook, Cheryne, Sleli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012), including less critical evaluation of hypothetical arguments (Stanovich & West, 1998;Svedholm & Lindeman, 2012) or an increased likelihood of endorsing conspiracy theories that most people reject based on careful scrutiny of the evidence (Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013;Lobato, Mendoza, Sims, & Chin, 2014). Although group differences in analytical thinking and logic tasks have not always been observed (compare Dagnall, Drinkwater, Parker, & Rowley, 2014, to Rogers, Davis, & Fisk, 2009, these represent some of the most reliable cognitive difference between paranormal believers and skeptics observed to date.…”
supporting
confidence: 84%
“…Evaluating Rogers et al's findings, Dagnall et al () concluded that there was no compelling evidence to support the notion that conjunction fallacy was a major factor associated with the development and maintenance of paranormal beliefs. More plausibly and consistent with the extant evidence is the possibility that believers susceptibility to conjunction error arises from their proneness to misperception of randomness (Tversky & Kahneman, , , ).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Several studies report positive associations between probability misjudgement and belief in the paranormal (Blackmore & Troscianko, ; Bressan, ; Brugger, Landis, & Regard, ; Brugger & Taylor, ; Dagnall, Drinkwater, Parker, & Rowley, ; Dagnall, Parker, & Munley, ). Seminally, Blackmore and Troscianko () observed that non‐believers (goats) outperformed psi believers (sheep) on tasks requiring judgements of probability.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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