The endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs (i.e. paranormal, conspiracy, and pseudoscientific beliefs) is both surprisingly widespread and has been shown to have important negative real-life consequences. For these reasons, it is important to understand individual differences in epistemically suspect beliefs and their associations with other cognitive phenomena, such as biases in reasoning and decision-making domain. In the present study (N = 397), I examined the relationship between five reasoning biases – belief bias, ratio bias, base-rate neglect, conjunction fallacy, and gambler’s fallacy – and the endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs. Moreover, I accounted for a wide range of cognitive and worldview variables, i.e. cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, numeracy, cognitive reflection, scientific reasoning, religious faith, and political liberalism. The results showed that overall bias susceptibility predicted unwarranted beliefs over and above all other predictors. Specifically, most notable relationships were observed in the case of gambler’s fallacy and belief bias, which is consistent with the extant theoretical accounts of the adoption and maintenance of epistemically suspect beliefs. In line with previous research, religious faith, political affiliation, scientific reasoning, and thinking dispositions also independently predicted the endorsement of unwarranted beliefs.