Minority nations v. constitutional architectures: A critical appraisal of unitary and federal models of the modern state

Abstract

Are the constitutional orders framed on a federal architecture more welcoming vis‐à‐vis the presence of minority nations within their midst than are the ones inspired by a unitarian logic? From an ideal‐typical perspective, to what degree unitary and federal models of the modern state are indeed meeting or conflicting with minority nations' most typical claim to be formally recognised and to possess the institutional anchorage to self‐govern and self‐determinate? Mobilising an analytical framework derived from the Societal Culture Index, this article combines constitutional studies with the tools of political theory. It argues that both unitary and federal models of the sovereign state have the potential to promote a normative rationale, that is, after all, fairly hospitable towards minority nations' typical claims. Nevertheless, it stresses that the normative rationale of federal systems in general, and asymmetrical federalism in particular, leads to constitutional architectures that shall be most hospitable towards minority nations.