Minority coalition governance in Denmark

Abstract

Coalition governance is a challenge for political parties because it involves cooperation and compromises between parties that have different political goals and are competitors in political elections. Coalition coordination is crucial for the intra-coalitional cooperation of the governing parties. A key element in coalition coordination is coalition agreements, which to a varying degree constrain the behaviour of the coalition partners. This article explores the share of laws that were precisely defined in government agreements and/or legislative agreements, and sets out to explain variation in this share of coalition agreement-based laws. The analyses are based on unique data on legislative as well as governmental coalition agreements entered by three Danish governments with varying parliamentary strength. This study brings the blooming literature on coalition agreements one step further by showing that coalition governance is influenced by government strength. The legislative practice of strong coalition governments is less accommodative but more pre-regulated by coalition agreements.

Cooperation between counterparts in parliament from an agenda-setting perspective: legislative coalitions as a trade of criticism and policy

“…That pattern is also observed in the Danish case in the rare situations with majority governments (Christiansen 2008;Christiansen and Pedersen 2014;Klemmensen 2005). Indeed, opposition criticism may be an overlooked explanation for why majority governments tend to lose votes, and minority governments sometimes could be attractive to form (Strøm 1990).…”

“…While offering procedural and substantial influence to the opposition may not seem particularly attractive to the government on the face of it, legislative agreements are nevertheless quite common in Denmark, and studies show that they are closely associated with minority governments and the parliamentary strength of these governments (Christiansen and Pedersen 2014;Klemmensen 2005; see also Klemmensen and Nørgaard 2009). This indicates that minority governments make such agreements with opposition parties out of an obvious necessity to have important legislation passed.…”

“…This is the case in Denmark for certain kinds of legislative coalitions called 'legislative agreements' (politiske forlig) (Christiansen 2008;Christiansen and Pedersen 2014;Strøm 1990). These are settlements between government and opposition parties, typically concerning topics of major importance and often containing bundles of legislation.…”

Fiscal Responsibility Laws: Are They Needed?

“…In order for coalition partners to reach consensus on a government's economic and fiscal policy program, some countries reach agreement on the annual and medium-term fiscal objectives to operate during the life of the government, typically around four years. Coalition agreements are not mere symbolic papers but substantive policy documents that facilitate inter-party cooperation and chart the policy course of the government (Christiansen and Pedersen, 2012). Such agreements have an impact similar to that of a limited-duration FRL.…”

Australian bicameralism as semi-parliamentarism: patterns of majority formation in 29 democracies

“…For one thing, when the electoral system is highly proportional (which seems necessary to align the median party on a separable dimension with the median voter), minority governments often consist of several parties, all of which do become veto players. For another, the imperative of cabinet stability often reduces the de facto flexibility of minority cabinets, because the opposition parties that keep the government in office demand substantial policy gains on issues salient to them (Christiansen and Pedersen 2014). More generally, once we abandon the assumption of purely policy-seeking actors and bring in votes and office as motivational factors, opposition parties may approach the status of veto players in the case of minority cabinets (Angelova et al 2017;Ganghof and Bräuninger 2006;Klüver and Zubek 2017).…”