2009
DOI: 10.1017/s1755020309990232
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Minimal Truth and Interpretability

Abstract: In this paper we will investigate different axiomatic theories of truth that are minimal in some sense. One criterion for minimality will be conservativity over Peano Arithmetic. We will then give a more fine-grained characterization by investigating some interpretability relations. We will show that disquotational theories of truth, as well as compositional theories of truth with restricted induction are relatively interpretable in Peano Arithmetic. Furthermore, we will give an example of a theory of truth th… Show more

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Cited by 14 publications
(35 citation statements)
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“…4 Technically speaking, this formula should be written so as to distinguish the logical operations of the meta-langauge with those of the object-language. For example, using Feferman's commonly used 'dot-convention', one would write:…”
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confidence: 99%
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“…4 Technically speaking, this formula should be written so as to distinguish the logical operations of the meta-langauge with those of the object-language. For example, using Feferman's commonly used 'dot-convention', one would write:…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…FT over PA within PRA was first claimed by Halbach in [7], using cut-elimination. 16 Later, Fischer [4] gave a proof, based on the cut-elimination argument in [7], to show that PA FT is interpretable in PA. Unfortunately, a gap was discovered recently (by Fujimoto) in the cut-elimination argument in [7], which in turn impaired Fischer's interpretability claim.…”
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confidence: 99%
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“…Thus we may conclude It remains open, however, whether this is also the case for the truth axioms alone. Fischer, in [5], discusses a further consequence of a formalised conservativeness proof for CT. Combining this with Theorem 1.1 therefore yields Corollary 6.5.…”
Section: Approximating Sequentsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…,k u)[g ] = F . ,N u,whence we apply Lemma 4.17 to(5) to obtain a derivation of Γ, T(F . ,N ϕ) ⇒ Δ, T(F .…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%