Mind the Gap: The Philosophy of Gillian Rose

Tubbs, Nigel

doi:10.1177/0725513600060000005

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Lucky Imaging.-In lucky imaging, a large number of images are observed and only the best, according to some criterion such as seeing, are retained. Fried (1978) and Tubbs (2003) describe such implementations in detail. An advantage of this approach is that the reconstruction of the true scene is based entirely on highquality data.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Image Co-Addition with Temporally Varying Kernels

Homrighausen

Genovese

Connolly

et al. 2011

Publications of the Astronomical Society of the Pacific

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Large, multi-frequency imaging surveys, such as the Large Synaptic Survey Telescope (LSST), need to do near-real time analysis of very large datasets. This raises a host of statistical and computational problems where standard methods do not work. In this paper, we study a proposed method for combining stacks of images into a single summary image, sometimes referred to as a template. This task is commonly referred to as image coaddition. In part, we focus on a method proposed in Kaiser (2004), which outlines a procedure for combining stacks of images in an online fashion in the Fourier domain. We evaluate this method by comparing it to two straightforward methods through the use of various criteria and simulations. Note that the goal is not to propose these comparison methods for use in their own right, but to ensure that additional complexity also provides substantially improved performance.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Image Co-Addition with Temporally Varying Kernels

Homrighausen

Genovese

Connolly

et al. 2011

Publications of the Astronomical Society of the Pacific

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“…In other words, we need to consider the ways in which the universal may be ‘actual’ – at work in the world. Remaining within the dualist paradigm, Chernilo takes for granted the form of reason which produces these contradictions (Tubbs : 48), and consequently underestimates the requirements of a transformed sociological reason. While any social theory presupposes some particular answers to philosophical questions – for example, those regarding the nature of the human being – it remains unclear in this account what might constitute a philosophical sociology.…”

Section: Sociology and Its Philosophical Othermentioning

confidence: 99%

Back to Hegel? On Gillian Rose's critique of sociological reason

Fuller

2017

British Journal of Sociology

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Thirty-five years ago, Gillian Rose articulated a significant critique of classical sociological reason, emphasizing its relationship to its philosophical forebears. In a series of works, but most significantly in her Hegel contra Sociology, Rose worked to specify the implications of sociology's failure, both in its critical Marxist and its 'scientific' forms, to move beyond Kant and to fully come to terms with the thought of Hegel. In this article, I unpack and explain the substance of her criticisms, developing the necessary Hegelian philosophical background on which she founded them. I argue that Rose's attempted recuperation of 'speculative reason' for social theory remains little understood, despite its continued relevance to contemporary debates concerning the nature and scope of sociological reason. As an illustration, I employ Rose to critique Chernilo's recent call for a more philosophically sophisticated sociology. From the vantage point of Rose, this particular account of a 'philosophical sociology' remains abstract and rooted in the neo-Kantian contradictions that continue to characterize sociology.

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“… On Rose's concept of the “broken middle” and its meaning in her philosophical project, see also Caygill ; Tubbs ; Lloyd ; Schick . …”

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confidence: 99%

The Diremption of Love: Gillian Rose on Agency, Mortality, and Hegelian Feminism

Angermann¹

2019

Hypatia

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Gillian Rose (1947–1995) was an influential though idiosyncratic British philosopher whose work helped introduce the Frankfurt School's critical theory and renew interest in Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Jewish thought in Anglo‐American philosophy. After years of relative oblivion, her life and thought have recently received new attention in philosophy, sociology, and theology. However, her work's critical Hegelian contribution to feminist philosophy still remains unexplored. This article seeks to reassess the place and the meaning of feminism and gender identity in Rose's work by addressing both her philosophical writings and her personal memoir, written in the months preceding her untimely death. It argues that although Rose's overall work was not developed in a feminist context, her philosophy, and in particular her ethical‐political notion of diremption, is valuable for developing a critical feminist philosophy that overcomes the binaries of law and morality, inclusion and exclusion, power and powerlessness—and focuses on the meaning of love as negotiating, rather than mediating, these oppositions.

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Mind the Gap: The Philosophy of Gillian Rose

Cited by 3 publications

References 1 publication

Image Co-Addition with Temporally Varying Kernels

Image Co-Addition with Temporally Varying Kernels

Back to Hegel? On Gillian Rose's critique of sociological reason

The Diremption of Love: Gillian Rose on Agency, Mortality, and Hegelian Feminism

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