2019
DOI: 10.1111/hypa.12471
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The Diremption of Love: Gillian Rose on Agency, Mortality, and Hegelian Feminism

Abstract: Gillian Rose (1947–1995) was an influential though idiosyncratic British philosopher whose work helped introduce the Frankfurt School's critical theory and renew interest in Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Jewish thought in Anglo‐American philosophy. After years of relative oblivion, her life and thought have recently received new attention in philosophy, sociology, and theology. However, her work's critical Hegelian contribution to feminist philosophy still remains unexplored. This article seeks to reassess the place… Show more

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“…Therefore, we can read a certain degree of spontaneity vis-à-vis "subject-knowers," "objects of knowledge," and relations among "subject-knowers" at the root of Hutchings's reading of Hegel and the "simultaneous identity and non-identity of being and truth" (Hutchings 2003, 109). For Hutchings, via Hegel, we can never know reality because reality, and we as part of reality, are in significance of Rose to contemporary readings of Hegel should be noted, and her limited involvement in my analysis here does not reflect on the importance of her contribution (see Angermann 2019;Schick 2012Schick , 2015.…”
Section: B Feminist Readings Of Hegel's Substance As Subjectmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, we can read a certain degree of spontaneity vis-à-vis "subject-knowers," "objects of knowledge," and relations among "subject-knowers" at the root of Hutchings's reading of Hegel and the "simultaneous identity and non-identity of being and truth" (Hutchings 2003, 109). For Hutchings, via Hegel, we can never know reality because reality, and we as part of reality, are in significance of Rose to contemporary readings of Hegel should be noted, and her limited involvement in my analysis here does not reflect on the importance of her contribution (see Angermann 2019;Schick 2012Schick , 2015.…”
Section: B Feminist Readings Of Hegel's Substance As Subjectmentioning
confidence: 99%