MIMESIS AND UNDERSTANDING: AN INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE’S POETICS 4.1448B4–19

Abstract

The structure of the first chapters of the Poetics, before Aristotle embarks on the discussion of tragedy proper, is clear enough: chapters 1-3 set forth a triple classification of the kinds of mimesis, based on the Platonic method of diaí resiv (in this case according to the means, the object, and the modes of mimesis respectively), while chapters 4 and 5 discuss the origins and the development of the major poetical genres. 1 More specifically, the first part of chapter 4 (a chapter 'der interessantesten, gehaltsreichsten, aber auch schwierigsten der Poetik', as Gudeman has observed) expounds the two underlying causes of poetry: (i) man's natural tendency towards mimesis and (ii) his innate affection for rhythm and harmony. 2 Speaking of the natural instinct of mimesis, Aristotle stresses from the outset that this constitutes man's distinctive feature, which sets him apart from all other species: man is since early childhood the mimetic being par excellence, and he develops his earliest understanding through mimesis. 3 Aristotle then proceeds to underline a second feature that distinguishes humans from other animals: 'all humans find pleasure in mimetic objects'. At this point he continues as follows (1448b12): shmeĩ on de`tou´tou to`sumbaĩ non eÒ pì tw n eØ rgwn. a× ga`r auÒ ta`luphrw v oÖ rw men, tou´twn ta`v ei Ò ko´nav ta`v má lista hÒ kribwme´nav caí romen qewroũntev, oi Fon qhrí wn te morwa`v tw n a Ò timota´twn kaì nekrw n. ai Ø tion de`kaì tou´tou, oÓ ti manqa´nein ouÒ mo´non toĩ v wilosó woiv hÓ diston aÒ llà kaì toĩ v aØ lloiv oÖ moí wv, aÒ ll' eÒ pì bracu`koinwnoũsin auÒ toũ. dia`gà r toũto caí rousi tà v ei Ò ko´nav oÖ rw ntev, oÓ ti sumbaí nei qewroũntav manqá nein kaì sullogi´zesqai tí eÓ kaston, oi Fon oÓ ti ou Ftov eÒ keĩ nov. eÒ peì eÒ a`n mh tu´c} proewrakẃ v, ouÒ c } F mí mhma poih sei th n h Ö donh`n a Ò lla`dia`th`n a Ò pergasí an h Õ th`n croia`n h Õ dia`toiau´thn aØ llhn ai Ò tí an. The content of the quoted passage is, in general terms, unambiguous. First, Aristotle presents an 'empirical verification' (eÒ pì tw n eØ rgwn) of the fact that the pleasure felt in things imitated is universal: mimetic works with an unpleasant content still offer pleasure, and this in their own right, not only on account of their workmanship. Second, he underscores the natural cause which explains both the pleasure drawn from imitations * I wish to express my gratitude to A. Schmitt, V. Liapis, and Th. K. Stephanopoulos, who read an earlier draft of this paper and offered a number of useful comments. Thanks are also due to the anonymous referee, whose careful comments improved this paper.

Cognition in Aristotle's Poetics

“…29 Halliwell (2002), 187, 188 n.31 (larger discussion: 186-93). 30 Tsitsiridis (2005), 443 (original emphasis). Though I have reached different conclusions, I found Tsitsiridis' discussion extremely helpful in understanding the nature of the problem in this passage.…”

“…11 Some deny empeiria to non-human animals; e.g. Tsitsiridis (2005) Aristotle distinguishes perception from rational understanding (epistêmê) by relating the former to particulars and the latter to universals (APo. 1.31, 87b28-88a7; Phys.…”

“…26 For present purposes, we can leave to one side the question whether these are the two causes which Aristotle mentions in 1448b4f., or conjointly the first of those two causes, the second being the instinct for melody and rhythm (mentioned at 1448b20f. ): see Tsitsiridis (2005), 435 n.2 for a recent overview of this debate. It is, at any rate, clear that the instinct for melody and rhythm is a cause of poetry (since the explanation of imitation in melodically and rhythmically elaborated language is incomplete without it), whether or not it is one of the two causes referred to initially.…”

Mímesis y máthesis: acerca de sus conexiones en la Poética de Aristóteles

“…1448b. Entre quienes se agrupan en esta posición puede señalarse a De Montmollin 1951 (Aristóteles 1951), Else 1957, Golden 1962, Lucas 1968(Aristóteles 1968, Halliwell 1992, Halliwell 1998, Halliwell 2001, Halliwell 2002, Sifakis 2001, Veloso 2004, Tsitsiridis 2005y Donini 2012. Por su parte, los defensores de una interpreta-Aunque la cuestión resulta trillada, 6 considero que dichas interpretaciones no se adentran en las características, contenido e implicaciones que genera un aprendizaje como el propuesto por Aristóteles, más allá de los límites de la cuestión del placer.…”

Annlee; or, Transposition as Artistic Device

“…For a recent critical discussion of this passage, seeTsitsiridis (2005). 22 See, for example,Mitchell (1974, 74-81).…”