Military Conscription and Nonviolent Resistance

Abstract

Nonviolent campaigns against repressive regimes often turn on the military’s decision to either defend the ruler or make common cause with the ruled. Yet surprisingly little scholarship investigates opposition expectations for the military’s likely response to mass protest. We theorize that some determinants of the military’s willingness to repress are more observable to activists than others. In particular, we identify conscription as a highly salient indicator that soldiers will refuse to fire on protesters and hypothesize that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to materialize against regimes with conscripted armies than those with volunteer forces. We substantiate this theory with two sources of evidence: (1) a survey experiment conducted during the 2019 Algerian Revolution and (2) a cross-national analysis of the positive association between conscription and nonviolent campaign onset from 1945 to 2013.

Ghosts of the Black Decade: How legacies of violence shaped Algeria’s Hirak protests

“…We first examine protest onset, or an individual’s decision to take to the streets. Among the many factors shaping this decision is one’s expectations of repression and retribution (Ritter & Conrad, 2016; Young, 2019; Cebul & Grewal, 2022). If individuals anticipate being arrested, tortured, or killed by the security forces or other armed groups, they are less likely to turn out.…”

“Twice the Citizen”: How Military Attitudes of Superiority Undermine Civilian Control in the United States

“…Since World War II, the United States has maintained a large standing military, which in 1973 transitioned to an all-volunteer force in which individuals self-select to join and maintain careers in the military. 2 A volunteer military produces distance between society and the military because those who self-select to join are not necessarily representative of society, and, unlike conscripts, often serve for long periods of time, severing their connection to their civilian identities (Feaver and Kohn 2001;Cebul and Grewal 2022).…”

Virtuous Shirking and Social Distance: Concept Measurement in the Context of Militarized Response to Nonviolent Revolution

“…Lee, 2009T. Lee, , 2015Lutscher, 2016;Makara, 2013Makara, , 2016McLauchlin, 2010McLauchlin, , 2018Morency-Laflamme, 2018;Prieur, 2011;Ritter, 2014;Tolstrup et al, 2019;Yap & Chu, 2015) and psychological explanations focused on identity, ideas, and moral costs (Cebul & Grewal, 2022;Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011;Greitens, 2016, pp. 51-52;T.…”

“…Existing theories of military responses to revolution generally fall into one of two categories: material explanations employing a cost–benefit rationale (Albrecht, 2015; Ambrosio, 2014; Bellin, 2004, 2012; Bou Nassif, 2013, 2015; Calculli, 2013; Koehler, 2017; Koehler et al, 2016; Koren, 2014; Kraemer, 2014; T. Lee, 2009, 2015; Lutscher, 2016; Makara, 2013, 2016; McLauchlin, 2010, 2018; Morency-Laflamme, 2018; Prieur, 2011; Ritter, 2014; Tolstrup et al, 2019; Yap & Chu, 2015) and psychological explanations focused on identity, ideas, and moral costs (Cebul & Grewal, 2022; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Greitens, 2016, pp. 51–52; T.…”