Mike or me? Self-recognition in a split-brain patient

Turk, David J.; Heatherton, Todd F.; Kelley, William M.; Funnell, Margaret G.; Gazzaniga, Michael S.; Macrae, C. Neil

doi:10.1038/nn907

Cited by 159 publications

(91 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Because of contralateral motor control, this left-hand advantage supports the view that the right hemisphere is predominant in self-recognition. A right hemispheric advantage for self-face recognition in a callosotomy patient has also been reported (Keenan et al, 2003c; but see Turk et al, 2002, for a left hemisphere advantage in another split-brain patient). In addition, patients who were undergoing Wada tests were shown images of themselves morphed with a famous face during right and left hemispheric anesthetization.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 78%

Here I am: The cortical correlates of visual self-recognition

et al. 2007

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Recently, interest in the neural correlates of self-recognition has grown. Most studies concentrate on self-face recognition. However, there is a lack of convergence as to precise neuroanatomical locations underlying self-face recognition. In addition, recognition of familiar persons from bodies has been relatively neglected. In the present study, cerebral activity while participants performed a task in which they had to indicate the real appearance of themselves and of a gender-matched close colleague among intact and altered pictures of faces and bodies was measured. The right frontal cortex and the insula were found to be the main regions specifically implicated in visual self-recognition compared with visual processing of other highly familiar persons. Moreover, the right anterior insula along with the right anterior cingulate seemed to play a role in the integration of information about oneself independently of the stimulus domain. The processing of self-related pictures was also compared to scrambled versions of these pictures. Results showed that different areas of the occipito-temporal cortex were more or less recruited depending on whether a face or a body was perceived, as it has already been reported by several recent studies. The implication of present findings for a general framework of person identification is discussed.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 78%

Here I am: The cortical correlates of visual self-recognition

et al. 2007

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“…That is, the patients successfully selected a picture of themselves (among an array of pictures of family members and acquaintances) with their right hand when the information was presented in the left hemisphere and with their left hand when the information was projected in the right hemisphere. Turk, Heatherton, Kelley, Funnell, Gazzaniga, and Macrae (2002) presented varying degrees of morphed images of self and familiar-other faces separately to the right and left hemispheres of one split-brain patient. The patient's task was to decide whether a given image displayed himself or a familiar other.…”

Section: -Mirror Self-face Recognition (A) Msr and Self-awarenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-recognition, theory-of-mind, and self-awareness: What side are you on?

Morin

2011

Laterality: Asymmetries of Body, Brain and Cognition

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A fashionable view in comparative psychology states that primates possess self-awareness because they exhibit mirror self-recognition (MSR), which in turn makes it possible to infer mental states in others ("Theory-of-Mind"; ToM). In cognitive neuroscience, an increasingly popular position holds that the right hemisphere represents the center of self-awareness because MSR and ToM tasks presumably increase activity in that hemisphere. In this chapter I critically assess these two claims as follows. MSR should not be equated with full-blown selfawareness; for instance, evidence suggests that MSR only requires kinesthetic self-knowledge and does not involve access to one's mental events. ToM and self-awareness are fairly independent and should also not be taken as equivalent notions; to illustrate, ToM implies a focus of attention on others, not on the self, whereas self-awareness exclusively entails self-focus. MSR and ToM tasks engage medial and left brain areas-not sites solely located in the right hemisphere, as recent meta-analyses of brain-imaging studies clearly show. Other selfawareness tasks besides MSR and ToM tasks (e.g., self-description, autobiography) mostly recruit medial and left brain areas. And inner speech, produced by the left hemisphere and which primates lack, plays a significant role in self-referential activity; indeed, accidental loss of inner speech following brain injury leads to self-awareness deficits. The conclusions I will reach based on this analysis is that (1) primates that display MSR most probably do not possess introspective self-awareness, and (2) self-related processes most likely engage a distributed network of brain regions situated in both hemispheres.

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“…Supramarginal gyrus, superior parietal lobule, precuneus Keenan et al (1999) Hand difference in reaction time for self-face recognition Unspecified right hemisphere Keenan et al (2000) Hand difference in reaction time for self-face recognition Unspecified right hemisphere Keenan et al (2001) Hemispheric difference in self-face recognition Unspecified right hemisphere Platek & Gallup (2002) Hand difference in reaction time for self-face recognition Unspecified right hemisphere Turk et al (2002) Hemispheric difference in self-face recognition in split-brain patient Unspecified left hemisphere Kircher et al (2000Kircher et al ( , 2001 Greater activation for self vs. partner face recognition representations used to discriminate own and other bodies (be these representations separate or integral) are precise. Within clinical neurology, there are many disorders of bodily sensation, action, and awareness (see Goldenberg, 2003, for a review), the most relevant being autotopagnosia and asomatognosia.…”

Section: Anterior Cingulate Gyrus Fusiform Gyrusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Self Special? A Critical Review of Evidence From Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience.

Gillihan¹,

Farah²

2005

Psychological Bulletin

392

304

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Varied research findings have been taken to support the claim that humans' representation of the self is "special," that is, that it emerges from systems that are physically and functionally distinct from those used for more general purpose cognitive processing. The authors evaluate this claim by reviewing the relevant literatures and addressing the criteria for considering a system special, the various operationalizations of self, and how the studies' findings relate to the conclusions drawn. The authors conclude that many of the claims for the special status of self-related processing are premature given the evidence and that the various self-related research programs do not seem to be illuminating a unitary, common system, despite individuals' subjective experience of a unified self.A basic goal of information-processing psychology is to characterize the computational architecture of the mind, that is, to delineate the components of the information-processing system and describe their functions. Within this common framework, theories differ according to how many distinct components are posited and how specialized their functions are. In the case of some kinds of human information processing, claims of extreme specialization have been made. Language, for example, is often said to be a product of systems that are physically and functionally distinct from those used for more general-purpose cognitive processing-in other words, language has been claimed to be special. Evidence for the claim that language is special includes its reliance on a network of perisylvian brain areas that are not needed for nonlinguistic sound recognition or vocalization and its species specificity. Face recognition is also considered special by many because it relies on parts of ventral visual cortex that are not needed for visual recognition of nonface objects and because face representation is more holistic than the representation of other objects.

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Mike or me? Self-recognition in a split-brain patient

Cited by 159 publications

References 13 publications

Here I am: The cortical correlates of visual self-recognition

Here I am: The cortical correlates of visual self-recognition

Self-recognition, theory-of-mind, and self-awareness: What side are you on?

Is Self Special? A Critical Review of Evidence From Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience.

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