Self-recognition, theory-of-mind, and self-awareness: What side are you on?

Abstract

A fashionable view in comparative psychology states that primates possess self-awareness because they exhibit mirror self-recognition (MSR), which in turn makes it possible to infer mental states in others ("Theory-of-Mind"; ToM). In cognitive neuroscience, an increasingly popular position holds that the right hemisphere represents the center of self-awareness because MSR and ToM tasks presumably increase activity in that hemisphere. In this chapter I critically assess these two claims as follows. MSR should not be equated with full-blown selfawareness; for instance, evidence suggests that MSR only requires kinesthetic self-knowledge and does not involve access to one's mental events. ToM and self-awareness are fairly independent and should also not be taken as equivalent notions; to illustrate, ToM implies a focus of attention on others, not on the self, whereas self-awareness exclusively entails self-focus. MSR and ToM tasks engage medial and left brain areas-not sites solely located in the right hemisphere, as recent meta-analyses of brain-imaging studies clearly show. Other selfawareness tasks besides MSR and ToM tasks (e.g., self-description, autobiography) mostly recruit medial and left brain areas. And inner speech, produced by the left hemisphere and which primates lack, plays a significant role in self-referential activity; indeed, accidental loss of inner speech following brain injury leads to self-awareness deficits. The conclusions I will reach based on this analysis is that (1) primates that display MSR most probably do not possess introspective self-awareness, and (2) self-related processes most likely engage a distributed network of brain regions situated in both hemispheres.

Inhibit yourself and understand the other: Neural basis of distinct processes underlying Theory of Mind

“…In the literature, both only left and only right as well as bilateral activation patterns have been described for ToM (Carrington and Bailey, 2009;Legrand and Ruby, 2009;Morin, 2010). Our results are in concordance with the results of Samson et al (2004).…”

Mirror-Mark Tests Performed on Jackdaws Reveal Potential Methodological Problems in the Use of Stickers in Avian Mark-Test Studies

“…This means that at least some individuals of those species are capable of identifying their own reflection in a mirror and, if experimentally marked with a visible coloured mark on their face (which is only visible in the mirror), they use their mirror-image to touch that mark [26]. The conclusion that self-directed behaviour in response to a mirror implies some form of human-like self-awareness is not free from controversy [27]–[29]; however, to some, it is clear that passing the mark test implies capacity for mirror self-recognition [30].…”

The Mystical Stance: The Experience of Self‐loss and Daniel Dennett's “Center of Narrative Gravity”

“…Some of those exploring brain regions associated with selfhood have argued that the right parietal lobe (Johnstone et al ) or broader regions within the right hemisphere may realize the self due to the fact that “injury to that hemisphere consistently leads to disturbances of the self” (Morin , 374), while others have maintained that much self‐related behavior engages “a wide network of sites located in both hemispheres of the brain” (Morin , 376). While the interpretation of the organism's mental and physical behavior in terms of a “self” is most likely realized by some portion of brain activity, these lower level physical processes are conceptually distinct from the “abstractum” that is the self.…”