Migration strategies of crisis-stricken youth in an enlarged European Union

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S ABSTRACT Migration Strategies of the Crisis-Stricken Youth in an Enlarged European UnionThis paper studies the migration response of the youth from new EU member states to disparate conditions in an enlarged European Union at the onset of the Great Recession. We use the Eurobarometer data and probabilistic econometric models to identify the key drivers of the intention to work in another member state of European Economic Area (EEA) and their expected duration. We find that migration intentions are high among those not married and among males with children, but both categories are also overrepresented among people with only temporary as opposed to long-term or permanent migration plans. Whereas age affects migration intentions negatively, education has no effect on whether working abroad is envisaged. However, conditional on envisaging to work abroad, completion of education (if after 16 th birthday) is associated with long-term (at least five years), but not permanent, migration plans. Finally, we find that socio-demographic variables explain about as much variation of migration intentions as self-reported push and pull factors and migration constraints. JEL Classification:F22, J61

Decision to Emigrate amongst the Youth in Lebanon

“…Having a university education level increases the propensity to emigrate by around 4.4 percentage points in line with the findings of Funkhouser () from Nicaragua, Papapanagos and Sanfey (), Epstein and Gang (), and Fetzer and Millan () from Singapore. However, the result on education is not in line with evidence reported by Kahanec and Fabo () from the EU, since in their case, would‐be emigrants are moving within the same economic region, the EU. Yet in Lebanon, higher education is seen as a means to increase the chance of winning what we can call the ‘emigration lottery’ and realizing the wage premiums to which education potentially entitles them.…”

“…Having a university education level increases the propensity to emigrate by around 4.4 percentage points in line with the findings of Funkhouser (1992) from Nicaragua, Papapanagos and Sanfey (2001), Epstein and Gang (2006), and Fetzer and Millan (2015) from Singapore. However, the result on education is not in line with evidence reported by Kahanec and Fabo (2013) Interestingly, the results indicate that youth receiving financial support from parents are less likely to emigrate. The corresponding marginal effect implies a decrease by 7.7 percentage points in the full model that is reported in column (7) and 7.9 percentage points in column (8).…”

Did Post-enlargement Labor Mobility Help the EU to Adjust During the Great Recession? The Case of Slovakia

“…This is consistent with the findings of other studies, which have argued that two distinct profiles of migrants from Slovakia were formed after the accession (Kureková 2011b): youth migrants mainly going to the new destinations (UK, Ireland) with short-term motives and not necessarily due to unemployment reasons; and more mature migrants who migrated to geographically closer destinations, were breadwinners, married and previously unemployed. These results are also consistent with those reported by Kahanec and Fabo (2013), who studied intentions to migrate from new member states.…”

Five Characteristics of Youth Unemployment in Europe

“…These include the economic situation in the sending and receiving country; policy measures inciting or preventing migration (the so-called transitional measures); geographic, language, and cultural proximity; as well as the differential distribution of migrant networks across Europe (Kahanec & Zimmermann, 2010). Youth mobility from East to West has also been discussed as a "choice" to "exit" native labor markets experiencing difficult economic conditions or as a "brain overflow," where younger cohorts have benefited from increased access to tertiary education, but these qualifications do not fit well with the structure of the labor demand in their own countries (Galgóczi, Leschke, & Watt, 2012;Kaczmarczyk & Okólski, 2008;Kahanec & Fabo, 2013;Kahanec & Mýtna Kureková, forthcoming;Kureková, 2011bKureková, , 2013OECD, 2012a).…”