Microlevel Opportunity Structures as Determinants of Non-Ceo Executive Pay.

Carpenter, Mason A.; Wade, James B.

doi:10.2307/3069426

Cited by 63 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 68 publications

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“…Second, according to managerial power perspective, CEOs tend to have strong influence over cash compensation (Carpenter and Wade, 2002). In contrast, because long-term incentives depend on long-term performance, they increase compensation risk and are not the type of compensation most CEOs prefer (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989).…”

Section: Independent Variable -Ceo Paymentioning

confidence: 97%

The impact of pay on CEO turnover: A test of two perspectives

Shen

Gentry

Tosi

2010

Journal of Business Research

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Section: Independent Variable -Ceo Paymentioning

confidence: 97%

The impact of pay on CEO turnover: A test of two perspectives

Shen

Gentry

Tosi

2010

Journal of Business Research

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“…Lewellen, Loderer, Martin & Blum (1992), Carpenter & Wade, 2002;Leonard, 1990). Based on the study conducted by Lewellen et al (1992), they found that executive compensation and firm performance has a positive relationship.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Directors’ Remuneration and Firm’s Performance: A Study on Malaysian Listed Firm under Consumer Product Industry

Razali¹,

Yee²,

Hwang³

et al. 2018

IBR

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Remuneration is broadly used as an incentive that affects decisions made and strategies planned by directors which cause great impact on firm performance and profitability. This study aims to investigate the directors' remuneration of the consumer products sector focusing particularly on Malaysian listed companies under Consumer Product Industry. These firm's performances are measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equities (ROE). This study consists a sample of 40 Malaysian listed companies for the period of 2012 to 2014. After controlling for board size, CEO duality, firm size, firm age, and leverage; the regression results show director remuneration has positive relationship with firm performance (measured by ROA and ROE). This suggests that high remuneration is able to motivate and retain directors in order to perform their duty and work harder for the best interest of shareholders. The result also shows all variables affect firm performance differently. For future research, we recommend that this study be expanded using more samples from other industries and other measurement of firm performances such as growth and ratings.

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“…Firm size was represented by the level of total assets with a logarithmic transformation to account for the skewness of the distribution. R&D intensity was calculated as R&D expenditures divided by sales (Balkin, Markman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000;Carpentar & Wade, 2002;Milkovich, Gerhart, & Hannon, 1991). This variable measures inputs into the innovation process and thus captures the extent of innovation opportunities within firms.…”

Section: Othermentioning

confidence: 99%