Methodological and Historical Problems in Determining Deterrence Success

Abstract

Beyond Deterrence" represents an important piece of cumulative scholarship that extends the authors' previous work, notably Lebow's Between Peace and War (1981), and Jervis, Lebow, and Stein's Psychology and Deterrence (1985). The present essay recapitulates their central thesis that deterrence is flawed as a theory of international relations and hazardous as a strategy of conflict behavior. Their work, from the outset, has been an intellectual tour de force of enormous scope, which applies theories of psychology to historical case material, thereby challenging one of the principal theories of contemporary international relations that derives its origin from game theory. One can hardly ask for a more interdisciplinary endeavor. The historical record of repeated deterrence failures, together with the problematic status of deterrence successes addressed in this paper, prompt the authors to propose as an alternative to deterrence a more balanced strategy of conflict management that would creatively integrate the punitive attributes of deterrence with the positive elements of reassurance.As an essay, "Beyond Deterrence" represents the best of this particular genre of scholarship: it is carefully organized, rich in historical illustrations and interpretations, and often counterintuitive in its line of argument. For all their intellectual and political commitment to a strategy of reassurance, Lebow and Stein are candid in their critical assessment of the difficulties of successfully launching such a strategy. The discussion of deterrence success and of the espoused strategy of reassurance, as presented in the essay, does not fully match the in-depth understanding of deterrence failure that distinguished Psychology and Deterrence. That book was the end product of an exhaustive research effort, whereas the present paper serves to stake out the authors' intellectual position, to