Metaphysics without Pre-Critical Monism: Hegel on Lower-Level Natural Kinds and the Structure of Reality

Abstract

Recent debates about Hegel's theoretical philosophy are marked by a surprising lack of agreement, extending all the way down to the most basic question: what is Hegel talking about? On the one hand, proponents of ‘metaphysical’ interpretations generally read Hegel as aiming to articulate the overall structure or organisation of reality itself, and the nature of a highest or most fundamental being. Particularly influential is the idea that Hegel is reviving and modifying a form of Spinoza's metaphysical monism, according to which the organised whole of everything is the highest being, providing a ground or reason for everything real. On the other hand, proponents of ‘non-metaphysical’ interpretations argue Hegel's topic is something else entirely. The idea is that Hegel agrees with Kant in finding pre-critical forms of metaphysics to be uncritical or dogmatic. And the topic of Hegel's positive project is supposed to be not the nature of reality itself, nor any most fundamental being, but rather ‘forms of thought’ akin to Kant's categories and the objectivity, legitimacy, or normative authority of those forms of thought.This is of course only a rough sketch of the most basic recent debate, about which there is more to say than can fit in this paper. My focus here is on what Hegel has to say about nature and natural kinds, in ‘Observing Reason’ from the Phenomenology, and also in similar material from the Logic and Encyclopedia. I intend to argue that this material suggests a surprising way of stepping beyond the fundamental debate sketched above. There can of course be no question of elaborating and defending here a complete interpretation of Hegel's entire theoretical philosophy. I will have to restrict myself to arguing for the unlikely conclusion that there is an approach that can combine and integrate the strongest points made by both sides in the most basic debate shaping recent Hegel interpretation.

Hegel's Essentialism. Natural Kinds and the Metaphysics of Explanation in Hegel's Theory of ‘the Concept’

“…While I agree with Kreines that inorganic nature for Hegel is devoid of categorical bases for dispositions and therefore lacks substantiality, these three points—and in particular the third one—speak against Kreines' pessimistic account of the intelligibility of inorganic nature (Kreines , ; cf. also notes 39 and 101).…”

“…also Boyd : 154–5. By contrast, Kreines : 58 understands natural kinds as being restricted to nature.…”

“…Stern : 58–9 and passim (who talks of ‘substance kinds’, cf. note 29 below); : 25–6; deVries : 63–5; Kreines : 325–6; : passim; : 362–3. (I shall explain my own usage of ‘natural kind’ in Section 1 below.…”

“…38–40, 43, 58–60; : 320–30; Stern : 24–7, 65–76. On Hegel's conceptual realism as a metaphysics of explanation, see also deVries : 11–7; Kreines ; . There have been further suggestions regarding the function of Hegel's conceptual realism (Stern : an account of the unity of objects; Westphal , : a presupposition for epistemological realism); but as I shall argue in note 42 below, these functions are less apt to support an argument for Hegel's conceptual realism.…”

Idealismus als Metaphysik der Freiheit: Hegel und Brandom

“…Denn die logische Struktur des Begriffs besteht in der intrinsischen und expliziten Einheit eines allgemeinen und eines besonderen Aspektes; Hegel kennzeichnet diese Einheit ihrerseits als drittes Begriffsmoment, das der Einzelheit. Henrich, 1971;Kreines, 2008). Indem wir z.…”