Metacognitive Labeling of Contentious Claims: Facts, Opinions, and Conspiracy Theories

Abstract

Congenial information is often judged to be more valid than uncongenial (but otherwise equivalent) information. The present research explores a related possibility concerning the process by which people label a claim as fundamentally factual (open to proof or disproof) or opinion (a matter of personal preference not amenable to falsification). Rather than merely being more skeptical of uncongenial claims, uncongenial claims may be metacognitively categorized as more opinion than factual, while congenial claims may be more likely to be categorized as factual. The two studies reported here attempt to trace a preliminary outline of how claims are categorized as fact, opinion, or some mix of the two in the context of mundane claims, contentious political issues, and conspiracy theories. The findings suggest that claims are more likely to be labeled factual (and, to a lesser extent, are less likely to be labeled opinion) to the extent that one subjectively agrees with the content of the claim. Conspiracy theories appear to occupy a middle-ground between fact and opinion. This metacognitive approach may help shed light on popular debate about conspiracy theories, as well as seemingly intractable political disagreements more generally, which may reflect fundamental differences in the perceived epistemic foundations of claims rather than simple disagreement over the facts of the matter. Given limitations of the stimuli and participant samples, however, it remains to be seen how generalizable these findings are.

Contemporary trends in psychological research on conspiracy beliefs. A systematic review

“…In another study priming resistance to persuasion decreased CBs ( Bonetto et al, 2018 ). Brotherton and Son (2021) discovered that claims regarding conspiracies were situated by participants between facts and opinions, and the extent to which such claims were perceived as facts was associated with the degree to which the individual agreed or disagreed with them.…”

The effects of higher-order human values and conspiracy beliefs on COVID-19-related behavior in Germany

“…Obviously, any discussion on various phenomena connected with conspiracy theories ultimately faces the very challenge of treading carefully on the side of the facts and not opinions (Brotherton and Son 2021). This leads to the issue of a metacognitive labeling of various claims.…”

Exploring the elements of opinion answers: the case of the Russo-Ukrainian war

“…The empirical findings can also be paralleled with the notion that in today´s society, conspiracy theories -unproven claims about the existence of nefarious secret plotsnecessarily blend factual claims about known events with speculation about concealed actions and the alleged conspirators' motives. Therefore, the blending of factual claims, ideological conviction, and opinionated speculation may position conspiracy theories somewhere between pure fact and pure opinion (Brotherton and Son, 2021). This phenomenon was most clearly identified while analysing the opinion answers offered by pro-Russia contributors.…”

“…Despite its ambiguous nature, Plato considered doxa to be a necessary constituent of human knowledge because knowledge is true opinion (Heffernan, 2017, p. 388). In the late 1700s, Kant articulated the traditional wisdom that there are three ways of believing something to be true: possessing factual knowledge (wissen), holding an opinion (meinen), and maintaining faith (glauben) (Brotherton and Son, 2021). However, as Brotherton and Son (2021) point out, Kant´s approach reflects an idealized epistemology in which clear distinctions between fact, opinion and faith can be drawn.…”

“…In the late 1700s, Kant articulated the traditional wisdom that there are three ways of believing something to be true: possessing factual knowledge (wissen), holding an opinion (meinen), and maintaining faith (glauben) (Brotherton and Son, 2021). However, as Brotherton and Son (2021) point out, Kant´s approach reflects an idealized epistemology in which clear distinctions between fact, opinion and faith can be drawn. In everyday reasoning, the boundaries may be more malleable.…”