Message Denial and Alteration on IEEE 802.15.4 Low-Power Radio Networks

O’Flynn, Colin

doi:10.1109/ntms.2011.5720580

Cited by 22 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…These are mainly based on jamming techniques which can lead to more serious DoS and man in the middle attack. The work in [40] showed that the additional security towards sweep and reactive jamming could be provided by the IEEE 802.15.4.e amendment with channel hopping. Also, authors proposed data encryption to prevent data denial.…”

Section: Attacks and Security Mechanisms For Phy And Mac Layer Commmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, as the encryption covers only MAC payload, an adversary might be able to read the 802.15.4 MAC header and decide on taking an action which can seriously affect the network. For example, if an adversary changes the frame counter or injects false data, that frame will be finally rejected, but it will waste some energy [40]. An additional threat to IEEE 802.25.4 comes from the fact that there is no integrity protection provided on ACK frames, so the eavesdropper can forge the ACK frame and fool the sender of the successful reception of the frame.…”

Section: Attacks and Security Mechanisms For Phy And Mac Layer Commmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Survey of Potential Security Issues in Existing Wireless Sensor Network Protocols

Tomić

McCann

2017

IEEE Internet Things J.

227

115

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Abstract-The increasing pervasiveness of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) in diverse application domains including critical infrastructure systems, sets an extremely high security bar in the design of WSN systems to exploit their full benefits, increasing trust while avoiding loss. Nevertheless, a combination of resource restrictions and the physical exposure of sensor devices inevitably cause such networks to be vulnerable to security threats, both external and internal. While several researchers have provided a set of open problems and challenges in WSN security and privacy, there is a gap in the systematic study of the security implications arising from the nature of existing communication protocols in WSNs. Therefore, we have carried out a deep-dive into the main security mechanisms and their effects on the most popular protocols and standards used in WSN deployments i.e. IEEE 802.15.4, B-MAC, 6LoWPAN, RPL, BCP, CTP, and CoAP, where potential security threats and existing countermeasures are discussed at each layer of WSN stack. This work culminates in a deeper analysis of network layer attacks deployed against the RPL routing protocol. We quantify the impact of individual attacks on the performance of a network using the Cooja network simulator. Finally, we discuss new research opportunities in network layer security and how to use Cooja as a benchmark for developing new defenses for WSN systems.

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Section: Attacks and Security Mechanisms For Phy And Mac Layer Commmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Attacks and Security Mechanisms For Phy And Mac Layer Commmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey of Potential Security Issues in Existing Wireless Sensor Network Protocols

Tomić

McCann

2017

IEEE Internet Things J.

227

115

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“…An attacker can deliberately use radio jamming to cause denial of service. In [19], three types of radio jamming attacks against 802.15.4 are implemented in hardware including:…”

Section: Radio Jammingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Smart Grid Cyber Security Challenges: Overview and Classification

Mendel¹

2017

e-mentor

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In this paper we present a model-based intrusion detection system (IDS) for home area networks (HANs) within the smart grid. Considering that ZigBee is the dominant technology in future HAN, the proposed IDS is designed to target ZigBee standard. Our focus is on the physical and medium access control (MAC) layers of ZigBee technology, which are defined in IEEE 802.15.4 standard. In the proposed IDS, normal behavior of the network is modeled through specifications extracted from the IEEE 802.15.4 standard as well as features of wireless network traffic. Deviations from normal behavior can be a sign of malicious activities. We use Bayesian network as a classifier to distinguish the normal and malicious behavior of the network according to extracted features. We further investigate the physical and MAC layer attacks in IEEE 802.15.4 networks that have been introduced in literature. In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed method we simulate a HAN network as well as some attack scenarios, in NS-2 simulation environment. We evaluate the performance of the proposed IDS against these attacks. Analysis and simulation results demonstrate that the proposed IDS provides good detection performance against known attacks, and since this is an IDS based on anomalous event detection, we expect the same for unknown attacks. KeywordsHAN, IDS, smart grid I TRODUCTIOSmart grid is a vision to modernize the electricity transmission and distribution systems. Smart grid incorporates computer intelligence into the power system, and provides two way energy flow and data communication. Unlocking the tremendous potential of the smart grid such as resilience, high power quality, and consumer participation, strongly depends on the security of this system. Integration of a data layer to the power grid can expose the system to many cyber security threats. Smart grid is an infrastructure that many other utilities rely on; without strong security measures, not only the smart grid will inherit the vulnerabilities of the legacy power system, but also new vulnerabilities will be added due to the proliferation of new technologies.In the 2009 White House Cyberspace Policy Review, federal government was asked to "ensure that security standards are developed and adopted to avoid creating unexpected opportunists to penetrate these systems or conduct large-scale attacks" [1]. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has provided guidelines for developers and policy makers, covering cyber security requirements of the smart grid that should be included from the beginning of the development process [2]. Along with the security mechanisms that should be designed into the smart grid with the goal of reducing the vulnerabilities and mitigating their consequences, such as cryptographic algorithms and secure protocols, appropriate intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are also required. The need for research on intrusion detection for embedded processors has been emphasized in "NIST guidelines for smart grid cyber security", ...

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“…At that time, the ZigBee family of protocols were solely layered on the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer standard. Some research, targeted solely at the 802.15.4 MAC layer, identified security concerns (see Sokullu, 2008;O'Flynn, 2011). Exploitation of these security issues could bring the link to the network down but would not provide access to application layer packet contents.…”

Section: Han Architecturementioning

confidence: 99%

Design of an Open Smart Energy Gateway for Smart Meter Data Management

Page

McParland

Piette

et al. 2015

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Executive SummaryWith the widespread deployment of electronic interval meters, commonly known as smart meters, came the promise of real-time data on electric energy consumption. Recognizing an opportunity to provide consumers access to their near real-time energy consumption data directly from their installed smart meter, we designed a mechanism for capturing those data for consumer use via an open smart energy gateway (OpenSEG). By design, OpenSEG provides a clearly defined boundary for equipment and data ownership.OpenSEG is an open-source data management platform to enable better data management of smart meter data. Effectively, it is an information architecture designed to work with the ZigBee Smart Energy Profile 1.x (SEP 1.x). It was specifically designed to reduce cyber-security risks and provide secure information directly from smart meters to consumers in near real time, using display devices already owned by the consumers. OpenSEG stores 48 hours of recent consumption data in a circular cache using a format consistent with commonly available archived (not real-time) consumption data such as Green Button, which is based on the Energy Services Provider Interface (ESPI) data standard. It consists of a common XML format for energy usage information and a data exchange protocol to facilitate automated data transfer upon utility customer authorization.

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Message Denial and Alteration on IEEE 802.15.4 Low-Power Radio Networks

Abstract: Abstract-Protection against the attacks through both academic and industry-developed standards is briefly discussed.Keywords-constrained devices, denial of service, low-power networks, security, man in the middle

Cited by 22 publications

References 5 publications

A Survey of Potential Security Issues in Existing Wireless Sensor Network Protocols

A Survey of Potential Security Issues in Existing Wireless Sensor Network Protocols

Smart Grid Cyber Security Challenges: Overview and Classification

Design of an Open Smart Energy Gateway for Smart Meter Data Management

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