Mercenaries in Asymmetric Conflicts

Abstract

Scott Fitzsimmons argues that small mercenary groups must maintain a superior military culture to successfully engage and defeat larger and better-equipped opponents. By developing and applying competing constructivist and neorealist theories of military performance to four asymmetric wars in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo, he demonstrates how mercenary groups that strongly emphasize behavioral norms encouraging their personnel to think creatively, make decisions on their own, take personal initiative, communicate accurate information within the group, enhance their technical proficiency and develop a sense of loyalty to their fellow fighters will exhibit vastly superior tactical capabilities to other mercenary groups. Fitzsimmons demonstrates that although the victorious mercenary groups occasionally had access to weapon systems unavailable to their opponents, the balance of material capabilities fielded by the opposing military forces had far less influence on the outcome of these asymmetric conflicts than the culturally determined tactical behavior exhibited by their personnel.

The Commercial Military Actor Database

“…That result is surprising, given the reputation of mercenaries as being ineffective forces or forces that only aggravate conflict (Aning et al 2000;Percy 2008). By extension, the result lends support to Fitzsimmon's findings that mercenaries are not inherently ineffective but that effectiveness depends on a culture of operation emphasizing adaptability and flexibility (Fitzsimmons 2013). Of course, governments also frequent the mercenary market segment, and the CMAD includes 256 such cases.…”

The mercenary moniker: Condemnations, contradictions and the politics of definition

“…Part of the broader phenomenon is the proliferation of different types of nonstate actors that engage in different kinds of armed conflict. All of these actors -including guerillas and rebels, jihadists and vigilantes, militias, mercenaries and terrorists -have come under renewed scholarly attention (Fitzsimmons, 2013;Khalil, 2013;Malet, 2013;Reno, 2011). The contemporary iteration of freelance companies -the private military firm -has prompted systematic distinctions between paramilitary firms and mercenaries, as well as typologies of the private military itself (Kinsey, 2006;Mandel, 2002;Singer, 2003).…”