Mentalizing capacities in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

Krachun, Carla

doi:10.22215/etd/2009-06331

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 170 publications

(400 reference statements)

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“…The tops of the containers are then covered with opaque lids. At this 10 Both Lurz and Krachun have recently defended the ARM theory: see Krachun (2008), Krachun et al (2010), andLurz (2011a, b). They also note that Humphrey (1976) and Gallup (1982) offer early defenses of the theory.…”

Section: Lurz and Krachun's Protocol -Pre-test Trialsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Povinelli’s Problem and Introspection

Roche

2013

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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Povinelli's Problem is a well-known methodological problem confronting those researching nonhuman primate cognition. In this paper I add a new wrinkle to this problem. The wrinkle concerns introspection, i.e., the ability to detect one's own mental states. I argue that introspection either creates a new obstacle to solving Povinelli's Problem, or creates a slightly different, but closely related, problem. I apply these arguments to Robert Lurz and Carla Krachun's (2011) recent attempt at solving Povinelli's Problem.

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Section: Lurz and Krachun's Protocol -Pre-test Trialsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Povinelli’s Problem and Introspection

Roche

2013

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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“…The experimental protocol that will be outlined below is based on an appearance-reality mindreading (ARM) theory, earlier versions of which can be found in Humphrey (1976) and Gallup (1982). More recent applications and defenses of the theory can be found in Krachun (2008), Krachun et al (2010), and Lurz (2011a, b). According to the ARM theory, mental state attribution, such as attributions of internal goals, evolved in the animal kingdom for the purpose of predicting the behavior of other agents (conspecifics, predators, or prey) in environmental settings in which the animal's competing behavior-reading counterparts could not.…”

Section: The Appearance-reality Mindreading Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

How Could We Know Whether Nonhuman Primates Understand Others’ Internal Goals and Intentions? Solving Povinelli’s Problem

Lurz

Krachun

2011

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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A persistent methodological problem in primate social cognition research has been how to determine experimentally whether primates represent the internal goals of other agents or just the external goals of their actions. This is an instance of Daniel Povinelli's more general challenge that no experimental protocol currently used in the field is capable of distinguishing genuine mindreading animals from their complementary behavior-reading counterparts. We argue that current methods used to test for internal-goal attribution in primates do not solve Povinelli's problem. To overcome the problem, a new type of experimental approach is needed, one which is supported by an alternative theoretical account of animal mindreading, called the appearance-reality mindreading (ARM) theory. We provide an outline of the ARM theory and show how it can be used to design a novel way to test for internal-goal attribution in chimpanzees. Unlike protocols currently in use, the experimental design presented here has the power, in principle and in practice, to distinguish genuine mindreading chimpanzees from those who predict others' behavior solely on the basis of behavioral/ environmental cues. Our solution to Povinelli's problem has important consequences for a similar debate in developmental psychology over when preverbal infants should be credited with the ability to attribute internal goals. If what we argue for here in the case of nonhuman primates is sound, then the clearest tests for internal-goal attribution in infants will be those that test for attributions of discrepant or 'false' perceptions.

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Mentalizing capacities in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

Cited by 2 publications

References 170 publications

Povinelli’s Problem and Introspection

Povinelli’s Problem and Introspection

How Could We Know Whether Nonhuman Primates Understand Others’ Internal Goals and Intentions? Solving Povinelli’s Problem

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