Povinelli's Problem is a well-known methodological problem confronting those researching nonhuman primate cognition. In this paper I add a new wrinkle to this problem. The wrinkle concerns introspection, i.e., the ability to detect one's own mental states. I argue that introspection either creates a new obstacle to solving Povinelli's Problem, or creates a slightly different, but closely related, problem. I apply these arguments to Robert Lurz and Carla Krachun's (2011) recent attempt at solving Povinelli's Problem.
Dretske's theory of self-knowledge is interesting but peculiar and can seem implausible. He denies that we can know by introspection that we have thoughts, feelings, and experiences. But he allows that we can know by introspection what we think, feel, and experience. We consider two puzzles. The first puzzle, PUZZLE 1, is interpretive. Is there a way of understanding Dretske's theory on which the (potential) knowledge affirmed by its positive side is different than the (potential) knowledge denied by its negative side? The second puzzle, PUZZLE 2, is substantive. Each of the following theses has some prima facie plausibility: (a) there is introspective knowledge of thoughts, (b) knowledge requires evidence, and (c) there are no experiences of thoughts. It is unclear, though, that these claims form a consistent set. These puzzles are not unrelated. Dretske's theory of self-knowledge is a potential solution to PUZZLE 2 in that if Dretske's theory is correct, then (a), (b), and (c) are all true. We provide a solution to PUZZLE 1 by appeal to Dretske's early work in the philosophy of language on contrastive focus. We then distinguish between "Closure" and "Transmissibility", and raise and answer a worry to the effect that Dretske's theory of self-knowledge runs counter to Transmissibility. These results help to secure Dretske's theory as a viable solution to PUZZLE 2.
Some philosophers have what we might call the "transparency intuition". This is the sense that we introspectively know our mental states by attending outwardly, towards the world. Gareth Evans' (1982) example is perhaps familiar. By considering whether there will be a third world war, I can know that I believe there will be a third world war. No inner glance is needed. Evans also suggests, oversimplifying a bit, that by considering how things are at this place now, I can know, e.g., that I am perceiving a partially filled coffee mug.Yet this world-to-mind procedure seems epistemically problematic. Understood as an inference, it can seem "mad" (Boyle 2011), for the worldly premise provides very weak support for its psychological conclusion. Propositions about wars and mugs are evidentially disconnected from those about one's psychology. The connection can be strengthened by supplementing the worldly premise with facts about oneself, but the transparency intuition does not depend on this.
The transparency approach to introspection has received much attention over the last few decades. It is inspired by some wellknown remarks from Gareth Evans (1982). Although this approach can seem quite plausible as applied to belief (and perhaps perception), philosophers tend to be
sceptical that it can succeed for other mental kinds. This paper focuses on desire. It lays out in detail a transparency theory of desire introspection and addresses various concerns and objections to such a theory. The paper takes as its launching point Alex Byrne's (2018) influential work
on transparency.
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