Mental travel: Some reservations.

Richman, Charles L.; Mitchell, David B.; Reznick, Jeffrey S.

doi:10.1037/0096-1523.5.1.13

Cited by 39 publications

(43 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…The present results and those of Pinker (1982, 1983), Intons-Peterson (1983), Mitchell and Richman (1980), Reed et al (1983), and Richman et al (1979) may leave the reader somewhat confused: In some cases researchers find effects of demand characteristics, and in other cases they do not. However, there seems to be one systematic result: Demand characteristics do not affect the slope of scanning functions.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 55%

“…For example, Reed et al (1983) found that subjects' estimates of the intercepts of the scan functions were affected by the shape of a scan path, but their estimates of the slope were noteven though differences in the scan path had large effects on the slope of the actual function. In addition, when Richman et al (1979) asked subjects to estimate the effects of distance on the time to scan, they obtained estimates DEMAND CHARACTERISTICS 331 of the slope that were almost 10 times steeper than the slopes actually obtained in scanning experiments. Why did we persistently fail to replicate the IntonsPeterson results on the intercepts of scanning functions?…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One alternative interpretation of the scanning results is that these results reveal nothing other than "experimenter expectancy effects." In this view, subjects (perhaps unconsciously) respond to cues given by the experimenter, leading them to perform as expected: responding more slowly when asked to scan greater distances (see Intons-Peterson, 1983; the "open peer review" of Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith, & Shwartz, 1979;Mitchell & Richman, 1980;Richman, Mitchell, & Reznick, 1979). According to this interpretation, subjects either deduce the purposes and predictions of the experiment from these cues and oblige by responding as expected, or they simply comply with cues about how to behave in the experiment.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Is time to scan visual images due to demand characteristics?

Jolicœur

Kosslyn

1985

Mem Cogn

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The time to scan across an object in a mental image increases with the distance scanned. Does this finding reflect the operation of underlying mechanisms or the effects of demand characteristics? Two types of demand characteristics were considered here. First, the scanning effects were shown to persist even when they conflicted with the experimenters' expectations. Experimenters were led to expect different rates of scanning and different effects of distance on scan times, but the results in all cases showed no hint of experimenter effects, instead displaying the usual increase in time with distance scanned. Second, the scanning effects were shown to persist in the absence of implicit task demands. Effects of distance were observed in an experiment in which subjects were never asked to scan the image; furthermore, such effects were observed only for items that should require spontaneous scanning even though they were randomly intermixed with items that should not, and this distinction was never mentioned nor alluded to in the instructions. Thus, experimenter effects and task demands are not sufficient explanations for the increase in the time to scan across an image as distance is increased.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 55%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Is time to scan visual images due to demand characteristics?

Jolicœur

Kosslyn

1985

Mem Cogn

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“…It might be, as has been suggested by several authors, that our subjects had tacit knowledge of what should happen when they had to walk longer distances, namely, that duration of the action should increase. If this were the case, the observed temporal invariance could be simply due to a strategy of the subjects of replicating in the mental condition the temporal sequence registered in the actual condition [43,45,35]. One possible way to answer this question is to introduce an external constraint on the motor task, such that the subjects would have to produce a greater effort to execute the same task.…”

Section: Mental Chronometrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Do imagined and executed actions share the same neural substrate?

Decety

1996

Cognitive Brain Research

535

291

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This paper addresses the issue of the functional correlates of motor imagery, using mental chronometry, monitoring the autonomic responses and measuring cerebral blood flow in humans. The timing of mentally simulated actions closely mimic actual movement times. Autonomic responses during motor imagery parallel the autonomic responses to actual exercise. Cerebral blood flow increases are observed in the motor cortices involved in the programming of actual movement (i.e. premotor cortex, anterior cingulate, inferior parietal lobule and cerebellum). These three sources of data provide converging support for the hypothesis that imagined and executed actions share, to some extent, the same central structures.

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“…But, after "inspection" of imagined tilted lines, observers reported that the orientation of the vertical target appeared unaltered, or tilted either toward or away from the imaginary tilted lines, depending on the expectations Singer and Sheehan (1965) had produced in their observers through the use of instructions. Singer and Sheehan (1965) discuss these "instruction-dependent" tilt aftereffects in terms of demand characteristics (see also Mitchell & Richman, 1980;Richman, Mitchell, & Reznick, 1979). While not exploring the influence of demand characteristics, Over and Broerse (1972) found that imagined vertical lines did not alter the detection threshold of a subsequently presented vertical target, even though the typical angular masking function was found with real masking stimuli.…”

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confidence: 99%

The influence of imagery ability on color aftereffects produced by physically present and imagined induction stimuli

Broerse¹,

Crassini

1980

Perception & Psychophysics

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Two methods of induction were used to produce orientation-contingent color aftereffects for observers assigned to one of three groups (high, medium, and low) on the basis of self-rated imagery ability. In Experiment 1, observers were required to make magnitude estimates of color aftereffects following inspection of stimulus patterns normally used to produce McCollough effects (e.g., red vertical contours, green horizontal contours). Experiment 2 was a partial replication of Experiment 1, with additional induction conditions in which observers were required to imagine the presence of appropriately oriented contours when particular homogeneous color patches were presented. The results indicated that self-rated imagery ability was not a significant factor in differentiating between observers' performance when orthodox induction procedures were used (Experiment 1). In addition, there were no reliable indications (Experiment 2) that imagined stimulus attributes can be effectively substituted for real stimulus attributes in order to produce orientation-contingent color aftereffects. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for the use of imagery-induced perceptual phenomena as a paradigm for investigating the possibility of common neural mechanisms in perception and imagination; in addition, the general implications of the results for understanding the functional significance of self-reported imagery ability are examined.Current empirical investigation of,and theoretical speculation about, the phenomenon of imagery is focused on two closely related issues. The first is concerned with the nature of the mental representations underlying imagery and incorporates the debate between those who argue that "visual imagery is encoded in terms of properties that are quite spatial and modality specific" and others who consider that "imagery is encoded in an abstract propositional format and that this same format is used to encode verbal information" (Anderson, 1978, pp. 249-250; see also Kosslyn & Pomerantz, 1977). The second issue involves the relationship between perception and imagination; Hebb (1968), for example, proposed that common neural mechanisms are involved in

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Mental travel: Some reservations.

Cited by 39 publications

References 8 publications

Is time to scan visual images due to demand characteristics?

Is time to scan visual images due to demand characteristics?

Do imagined and executed actions share the same neural substrate?

The influence of imagery ability on color aftereffects produced by physically present and imagined induction stimuli

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